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THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
IN LIGHT OF RECENT DELAWARE
RULINGS AND LEGISLATION
MARY WOODSON POAG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The business judgment rule1 is a common-law principle2 of
* Attorney, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas. B.A., 1983, College of Charleston; J.D.,
1986, University of South Carolina. The author prepared this paper, in its original form,
in satisfaction of degree requirements while attending the University of South Carolina.
The author wishes to express her thanks to Professors James Burkhard and Martin Mc-
Williams of the University of South Carolina School of Law and to attorneys at the law
firms of Hughes & Luce of Dallas and Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard of Columbia,
South Carolina for their valuable advice in the preparation of this paper.
1. This Article will not address the debate on whether (and when) to use the term
"business judgment doctrine" as compared to the term "business judgment rule." For a
brief discussion thereof, see Veasey, New Insights Into Judicial Deference to Directors'
Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1462 n.2 (1984)
[hereinafter Veasey, New Insights]; see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del. 1986).
2. The business judgment rule was originally developed by the judiciary; however, in
recent years many states have codified the directors' duty of care, which is an integral
part of the business judgment rule. Moreover, the American Bar Association, in an effort
to produce a uniform codification of the law regarding corporations, promulgated the
Model Business Corporation Act, see MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 1.01-16.22 (1969) [here-
inafter MBCA], which has since been revised, see REvIsED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§
1.01-17.06 (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA]. The MBCA and RMBCA will hereinafter be
referred to jointly as the Model Acts. Section 8.30(a) of the RMBCA, patterned after
MBCA § 35, sets forth the general standard of care for directors:
(a) director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
RMBCA § 8.30(a). As of 1986, 31 states had adopted statutory provisions substantially
similiar to the MBCA or otherwise had provided for a general standard of care based on
prudent or reasonable conduct. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74 (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE §
309(a) (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
313(d) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 607.111(4) (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-152
1
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corporate governance that has been a part of American jurispru-
dence for over 150 years.3 Under this rule, courts generally defer
to the business decisions of a corporation's board of directors
and will not impose liability upon directors for honest mistakes
of business judgment.4 However, while most states accord corpo-
rate boards of directors great latitude in deciding how the busi-
ness of the corporation shall be managed,5 at some point the
(Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-91.5(c) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); IND.
CODE ANN. § 1-35-1 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:91 (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1986); MD.
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1(a) (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65
(West Supp, 1986); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541(1) (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.251 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401(2) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:35.II (Cum. Supp. 1986) N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:6-14 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
717 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B)
(Page 1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57.228 (Butterworth 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1408(A) (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-43 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-
150 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-813 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.343
(Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-133(b) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1986); see also Cohn,
Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions
Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591, 593 n.7 (1983). South Caro-
lina's Business Corporation Act is based upon the language of the MBCA; however, the
South Carolina Legislature is currently considering a revision of the Act designed to
make it conform more closely to the RMBCA. Some states, including Delaware, have not
adopted the MBCA, RMBCA, or any codification of the standards of care; rather, case
law sets forth the applicable standard of care. See Veasey & Manning, Codified Stan-
dard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care
Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 921 (1980) [hereinafter Veasey & Man-
ning, Codified Standard].
3. See, e.g., Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Godbold v. Branch
Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); see also Arsht,
The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93, 134 (1979).
4. Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927); see also
Veasey, New Insights, supra note 1, at 1464. An early Delaware Supreme Court defini-
tion of the business judgment rule is an appropriate starting point for further analysis:
"If in the particular case there is nothing to show that the directors did not exercise their
discretion for what they believed to be the best interest of the corporation, certainly an
honest mistake of business judgment should not be reviewable by the Court." Bodell, 15
Del. Ch. at 424, 140 A. at 267.
The basic premise underlying the business judgment rule is simply that when direc-
tors have acted with due care and in good faith, a court typically will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board by reviewing the merits of the transaction itself. To per-
mit judicial review of business transactions that are not tainted with bad faith would be
an emasculation of the rule itself. See Brown & Phillips, The Business Judgment Rule,
1981-82 CORP. PnAc. COMMENTATOR 505, 517-18. Thus, the business judgment rule serves
as a gauge of conduct. Under the rule, courts will review the decisionmaking process, but
not the decision itself.
5. Most states require corporations to be "managed under the direction of" a board
2
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courts will intervene at the behest of stockholders and impose
liability upon directors for their business decisions.6
Unfortunately, it is not always clear when directors are enti-
tled to the protection of the business judgment rule.7 Recent rul-
ings of the Delaware courts, which appear to take differing views
of when directors should be held personally liable for their busi-
ness decisions, highlight the need for clarity in this area.8 The
uncertainty caused by these differing views has casued directors
to turn increasingly to corporate attorneys for guidance in ascer-
taining the standard of conduct required of them to avoid
liability.
This Article will analyze the business judgment rule by re-
viewing its genesis and rationale and by examining its recent ap-
plication. Because South Carolina has very little corporate juris-
prudence, this Article will examine, at some length, recent
Delaware court decisions and legislation regarding the rule and
attempt to set forth a definitive restatement of the business
judgment rule under Delaware law. Finally, this Article will
compare existing South Carolina law with that of Delaware and
attempt to determine how the South Carolina courts would
likely view the business judgment rule today. The objective of
the Article is to aid the corporate lawyer both in the boardroom
and in the courtroom, by enabling him better to advise directors
on the business judgment rule's protections and to defend them
of directors. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-10
(1976); see RMBCA § 8.01(b); see also Veasey, New Insights, supra note 1, at 1463-65.
Shareholders elect directors to oversee their investment. The directors then conduct cor-
porate business independently, without input from the shareholders, except in instances
in which a vote may affect the nature of the investment. See Brown & Phillips, supra
note 4, at 507.
Implicit in the statutory language, however, is the directors' right to delegate
work-particularly work relating to the day-to-day functioning of the corporation. The
drafters of the MBCA opted against the phrase "managed by the board of directors"
because they did not wish to require directors to become involved in the detailed admin-
istration of corporate affairs. This close involvement was felt to be inconsistent with the
advent of the outside director. See Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard, supra note 2,
at 923-24.
6. See Arsht, supra note 3, at 93.
7. See Veasey, New Insights, supra note 1, at 1464.
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985). Decisions on corporate matters rendered by the
Delaware courts are of interest in all jurisdictions in the United States because of the
vast number of companies incorporated in Delaware and because of the enormous influ-
ence that Delaware's courts have on business law.
1987]
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adequately should a suit be initiated challenging board action.
H. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: GENESIS AND APPLICATION
Most practitioners regard the business judgment rule as a
shield from liability.' The rule, however, also implicitly imposes
significant duties on directors through limitations on its applica-
bility.10 Stated simply, a corporate director forfeits the benefits
of the business judgment rule and exposes himself to personal
liability if he violates either his duty of care or his duty of loy-
alty to the corporation and its shareholders.11
This notion of directorial duties is an outgrowth of the cor-
porate form itself, in which the operational control of the enter-
prise is separated from ownership. A board of directors manages
the corporation, and shareholders do not take part in day-to-day
business decisions. 12 Because of this separation of ownership and
9. See Block, Barton & Radin, The Business Judgment Rule-Application, Limita-
tions and the Burden of Proof, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, OFFICERS' AND DIRECTORS'
LIABILITY: A REVIEW OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 9, 19 (1985). Goldwasser enumer-
ates five elements that must be present in order for the rule to shield directors from
liability: (1) a business decision, (2) disinterestedness, (3) due care, (4) no abuse of dis-
cretion, and (5) good faith. Id. at 19-24; see also Arsht, supra note 3, at 114-30. As a
shield, the rule has two major effects. It prevents the court from reviewing the merits of
a directorial decision once it appears that the directors acted diligently and in good faith,
and it provides a presumption in the director's favor on the issues of good faith and due
care. Balotti, Finkelstein & Abrams, The Business Judgment Rule in Delaware: Corpo-
rate Control Contests and Executive Compensation, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, OF-
FICERS' AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITY: A REVIEW OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 305, 316
(1985).
10. Arsht, supra note 3, at 96; see also Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same
Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947, 958-59 (1980). The busi-
ness judgment rule should not be viewed, however, as an independent source of liability;
rather, it is a presumption that directors have met their directorial duties. Directors
must fulfill those duties as a precondition to the applicability of the business judgment
rule.
11. See Veasey, New Insights, supra note 1, at 1464. For an extensive discussion of
directors' legal obligations, which fall into these two broad categories, see generally Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American
Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978) [hereinafter
Guidebook]. The Guidebook is the second major contribution of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, in addition to the Model Acts, in the area of corporate law. The Guidebook fo-
cuses essentially upon MBCA § 35 and attempts to set forth the general requirements
that directors must meet in discharging their duty of care.
12. See Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAW.
1383, 1385 (1985); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (stating that
"[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation law of the State of Delaware is that
4
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control, the law requires corporate directors to act in a manner
consistent with the confidence placed in them.1 3 Thus, directors
owe certain fiduciary duties to the corporation and its share-
holder owners. Although analogous to fiduciary duties existing
under the law of trusts, these duties are less demanding since
directors' obligations are tempered by their corresponding re-
sponsibility to take business risks.14
Courts thus devised the business judgment rule to accom-
modate the corporate director's role as a fiduciary with the reali-
ties of the business world.1 5 The genesis of the rule lies in the
judicial concern that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity
would not serve as directors if shareholders strictly enforced the
fiduciary standard. 6 Early cases established prudence, rather
than perfection, as the standard imposed upon directors, 7 in
recognition of the fundamental premise that directors are not
infallible. Other bases for the rule are the notions that directors
cannot please all of the shareholders all of the time and that
business and judicial economy would be hampered if dissatisfied
stockholders were allowed to challenge every corporate
transaction. 8
directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation").
13. Ruder, supra note 12, at 1385.
14. Id. Although the "fiduciary" standard is generally considered inappropriate,
courts typically continue to use the term "fiduciary" while nevertheless invoking the bus-
iness judgment rule to shield directors from liability. See Veasey & Manning, Codified
Standard, supra note 2, at 925-26.
Neither the RMBCA nor the South Carolina version thereof uses the term "fiduci-
ary" in their formulations of the general standard of conduct for directors. See RMBCA
§ 8.30 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(a) (1976). South Carolina case law, however,
does proclaim the existence of a fiduciary relationship between directors and individual
stockholders. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
15. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074 (Del. Ch. 1985).
16. Arsht, supra note 3, at 97.
17. See Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847) (rejecting a requirement of
extreme accuracy of knowledge and stating that "[tihe inevitable tendency of such a rule
would be hostile to the end proposed by it, as no man of ordinary prudence would accept
a trust surrounded by such perils"); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829)
(stating that a contrary doctrine would "suppose the possession, and require the exercise
of perfect wisdom in fallible beings. No man would undertake to render a service to
another on such severe conditions."); Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co., 12 R.I. 312 (1850)
(stating that "[i]f . . .the mistake be such as the directors might well make notwith-
standing the exercise of proper care, and if they acted in good faith and for the benefit of
the... [company], they ought not to be liable"); see also Arsht, supra note 3, at 97-99.
18. See Arsht, supra note 3, at 95. Moreover, directors are selected because of their
expertise and superior access to information, and they are in the best position to know
5
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Understanding the rationale behind the business judgment
rule does not, of course, end the analysis. Whether a director
will be found liable under a given set of circumstances depends
in large part upon prevailing judicial attitudes and business
practices, and courts typically will measure the director's con-
duct against a specified standard of care. l" The subjectivity in-
how much information should be acquired for a particular decision. Fischel, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1441 (1985). Mr.
Fischel explains:
Allowing shareholders to challenge business decisions on the basis that they
were not "informed" has the effect of substituting the business judgment of
some shareholders, their attorneys, and a court on the issue of how much infor-
mation should be acquired for the business judgment of those entrusted, by
virtue of their superior expertise and incentives, with managing the firm's
affairs.
Id.
Moreover, shareholder litigation challenging corporate decisions goes against the
traditional one-share/one-vote rule, which gives those shareholders with the largest stake
in the corporation the greatest influence over corporate policy. Id. at 1443. The small
shareholder will sue if the expected value of the attorneys' fees award exceeds the cost of
litigation. Typically, he will not consider the adverse effects on risktaking or on other
areas affecting the value of the company. Id. The argument is not that all shareholder
litigation is unhealthy, but that the problems connected with such litigation, coupled
with other drawbacks of the liability rules, counsel against allowing shareholders to chal-
lenge the business decisions of directors, including the decision of how much information
to acquire before entering into a transaction. Id. at 1444.
19. See Arsht, supra note 3, at 96-97. While this subjectivity may give rise to criti-
cism, its practical effect simply may be to provide corporate directors with protection
analogous to that enjoyed by professionals, such as doctors or lawyers, under tort law if
sued for malpractice on the basis of their medical or legal decisions. Id. at 97. Some
commentators argue that the injection of tort concepts into a boardroom setting is inap-
propriate. See, e.g., Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute Allows Limits on Di-
rector Liability and Modernizes Indemnification Protection, Bus. LAW. UPDATE, July-
Aug. 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute] (criticizing
the "gross negligence" standard). Practitioners, however, must accept the subjective
standard as necessary in assessing the potential liability of directors for a board decision
since the circumstances under which the business judgment rule defense can arise are
varied and cannot be addressed effectively under a statutory formulation of the rule.
Indeed, the official comments to RMBCA § 8.30 state that courts have sometimes used
language similar to the standards set forth in § 8.30(a) when purporting to apply the
buniness judgment rule. Nevertheless, the drafters of the RMBCA noted:
The elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for its ap-
plication are continuing to be developed by the courts ... section 8.30 does not
try to codify the business judgment rule or to delineate the differences, if any,
between that rule and the standards of director conduct set forth in this sec-
tion. That is a task left to the courts and possibly to later revisions of this
Model Act.
RMBCA § 8.30 official comments at 221. The drafters purposefully chose not to include
an extensive analysis of the relationship between § 8.30 and the common-law business
6
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herent in such an analysis underscores the importance of follow-
ing judicial trends.
Unfortunately, South Carolina has very little jurisprudence
in the corporate area, and no South Carolina cases directly ad-
dress the business judgment rule. It is necessary, therefore, to
hypothesize to a degree when attempting to set forth how the
courts of this State would respond if faced with a challenge to
board action and a defense based upon the business judgment
rule. In all likelihood, South Carolina courts would look for guid-
ance to Delaware common law because the courts of that State
are highly respected in the area of corporate jurisprudence. In-
deed, on at least one occasion, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has expressed its willingness to look to Delaware case law
when dealing with corporate matters.20 In any event, reference
to Delaware case law specifically addressing the business judg-
ment rule is advisable because of several recent, significant ex-
positions by Delaware courts on that rule.
III. RECENT DELAWARE LAW REGARDING THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
A. Aronson v. Lewis: A Restatement of the Business
Judgment Rule
Despite its lofty reputation in the area of corporate law, the
Delaware Supreme Court, until recently, had discussed the busi-
ness judgment rule only in fragments.2 1 In 1984, however, that
court set forth a comprehensive analysis of the protections and
limitations of the rule in Aronson v. Lewis,22 defining it as a pre-
judgment rule in light of substantial adverse comments to the exposure draft, which in-
cluded such an attempt. MOnaL Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. § 8.30, at 933-934 (1986).
20. See Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
21. See Pease, Aronson v. Lewis: When Demand Is Excused and Delaware's Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, 9 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 39, 57 (1984).
22. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Aronson dealt with the demand requirement in share-
holder derivative suits. In Aronson the court addressed a major question that had been
left unanswered in the earlier landmark case in this area, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), by deciding when demand is futile and, therefore, excused. 473
A.2d at 813-14. The court stated that demand is excused only when a shareholder alleges
specific facts that create a reasonable doubt that the business judgment rule protects the
directors' action. Id. at 814-15. See generally Note, Shareholder Seeking to Excuse De-
mand as Futile Must Overcome the Protection of the Business Judgment Rule, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 167 (1985).
1987] 283
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sumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted: (1) on an informed basis, (2) in good faith,
and (3) in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.23 Absent an abuse of discretion,24
The Aronson decision demonstrates that the business judgment rule may be used
not only as a defense on the merits to a suit challenging board action, but also as a tool
to cut off derivative litigation that is not considered to be in the best interest of the
corporation. See Brown & Phillips, supra note 4, at 505. When used in this manner, the
rule is said to be used "offensively"; it is not used to defend the propriety of the underly-
ing action, but, rather, to secure the dismissal of a suit without ever reaching the merits
of the claims. See Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 72.
The Aronson analysis of the business judgment rule presumably is not limited to the
question of demand futility and is, instead, applicable to various transactions that are
addressed by a board of directors. The court in Aronson, however, probably sought to
further the policies that the demand requirement imposes upon derivative plain-
tiffs-primarily the desire not to impinge too greatly on the managerial freedom of direc-
tors-by rigidly adhering to the business judgment rule. See Note, supra, at 172. One
effect of the Aronson decision is to strengthen the position of corporate boards of direc-
tors, making it more difficult for derivative actions to proceed without their support. Id.
at 173. For a comprehensive discussion of the effect of Aronson on earlier decisions, see
Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business Judg-
ment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503 (1984).
23. 473 A.2d at 812. Stated another way, the business judgment rule, under the Ar-
onson formulation, will not apply if the plaintiff can show that:
(1) the directors (a) stood on both sides of the transaction, (b) had a personal
financial interest not shared by the corporation and shareholders, or (c) lacked
independence because of domination and control by a person or group, or (2)
the directors (a) did not inform themselves, prior to making a business deci-
sion, of all material information reasonably available to them, and (b) did not
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.
Pease, supra note 21, at 71 (citations omitted).
The Aronson formulation of the business judgment rule represents the majority view
on the protection of directors against personal liability in the context of the adoption of
defensive mechanisms. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for Directors:
Planning for and Responding to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41 Bus. LAW. 209, 211 n.3
(1985) [hereinafter Guidelines for Directors]. One view is that the board of directors, in
defending against takeover attempts, may have an inherent self-interest and that the
board should bear the burden of demonstrating that its actions were not designed solely
to entrench incumbent management or perpetuate its control. Another view is that the
court should independently review the business justification for the action of a board
defending against a takeover. Id. at 211. A third view is that the burden of proof should
shift to the board: actions shown by the plaintiff to be likely to perpetuate the current
board's control are presumed invalid, but the board may rebut this presumption by prov-
ing that its actions were taken in the reasonable belief that they were in the corpora-
tion's best interests. Id.
24. 473 A.2d at 812. The "abuse of discretion" restriction may not be a limitation at
all, "but simply an application of the fundamental principle behind the rule. An honest
error in judgment is allowed. But a judgment that cannot be sustained on some rational
basis falls outside the protection of the business judgment rule ..... Arsht, supra note 3,
at 122; see also Pease, supra note 21, at 62. The judgment of the directors may, for
8
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stated the court in Aronson, the courts will respect the judgment
of the directors. Thus, the initial burden of proof lies with the
party challenging a corporate transaction, 25 and a court typically
will defer to the managerial decisions of the board of directors if
the board can establish that it acted in conformity with the as-
sumptions underlying the three-fold presumption set forth in
Aronson's definition of the rule.26
example, be considered irrational or outside the bounds of reason when the valuation of
assets approved by directors in a merger or sale of assets is far removed from the range
of values recommended by financial advisors. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599
(Del. Ch. 1974); Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128 A.2d 225 (1956), appeal
dismissed, 355 U.S. 12 (1957); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923); see also Pease, supra note 21, at 62. An abuse of discretion may
also be found when the board of directors attempts to change the date of its annual
meeting to obstruct the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders to undertake a proxy
contest. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); see also Pease,
supra note 21, at 62. The abuse of discretion limitation thus underscores the prohibition
against directors utilizing corporate machinery for the purpose of keeping themselves in
office. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439; cf. Petty v. Pentech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140
(Del. Ch. 1975) (officer used corporate funds for the sole purpose of entrenching
management).
25. 473 A.2d at 812; see also Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971).
This burden is to show by the preponderance of the evidence that the business judgment
rule does not apply. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); see also
Pease, supra note 21, at 58 n.95. Mere conclusory allegations will not meet the burden.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817. Once a plaintiff establishes a breach of the duty of loyalty or
the duty of care, the burden shifts to the directors to prove that the transaction at issue
was undertaken in good faith and after reasonable investigation or that it was fair and in
the best interests of the shareholders. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744
F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
26. The degree of judicial deference accorded to a board decision may vary depend-
ing on the type of decision involved. When, for example, a board addresses a pending
takeover bid, it has an obligation "to determine whether the offer is in the best interests
of the shareholders," and the board's decision should be no less entitled to the same
respect generally accorded other types of business decisions. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). Because of the constant concern that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred." Id.
Indeed, the court must "bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with
corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a threat to control is also
involved. The directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an
objective decision is difficult." Id. at 955 (quoting Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22,
187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)). In Unocal the court summarized the directors' duties by stat-
ing that they "must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership"
and that "they satisfy that burden 'by showing good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion.' " 493 A.2d at 955. The court further stated that "such proof is materially enhanced
... by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors
9
Poag: The Business Judgment Rule: An Analysis of South Carolina Law in
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
In order for directors to take advantage of the "informed
basis" aspect of the Aronson presumption, two conditions must
be met. First, "directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior
to making a business decision, of all material information rea-
sonably available to them. ' 27 Additionally, "having become so
informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge
of their duties. '28 The Aronson court based its definition of
"requisite care" upon concepts of "gross negligence." 2 Although
this terminology has generated much criticism,30 Delaware pre-
cedent clearly justified the formulation of a standard of care
"less exacting than simple negligence,""" and subsequent Dela-
who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards." Id.
27. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Questions of materiality and reasonableness of the
availability of information often arise in connection with the information requirement.
See Pease, supra note 21, at 66. For instance, a board may be presented with an oppor-
tunity to purchase the stock, assets, or product line of another company where there are
competing offers. Under these circumstances, there may not be sufficient time for direc-
tors to review all material information before a meeting, or this information may not
reasonably be available within the deadlines set by the offeree. Thus, directors often
have to rely upon the recommendations of the chief executive officer and outside experts.
Directors who approve a transaction without enough time to consider all material infor-
mation assume the risk that their action will not be shielded by the business judgment
rule. Id.; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors held liable
after making a quick decision relying primarily on the presentation and recommendation
of their chief executive officer).
The rationale for close judicial scrutiny of decisions made in haste is that "the inter-
ests of the shareholders are more likely to be injured when the board has acted without
maling a thorough investigation." Brown & Phillips, supra note 4, at 511. Contra PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, at 60 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter ALI Draft No. 3] ("A decision to accept the risk of in-
complete information, so long as the director reasonably believes such informational risk
taking to be appropriate under the circumstances, will be fully consistent with the appli-
cation of the business judgment rule to decisions made with respect to the principal
transaction.").
Although not specifically set forth in Aronson, a useful rule of thumb regarding the
level of information that a corporate director should demand when deciding how to vote
upon a given issue is that he should feel "sufficiently informed about a proposal so that
he can explain a vote for or against it." Guidebook, supra note 11, at 1609. The Guide-
book further suggests that if a director believes that adequate information is not being
provided and is unsuccessful in his efforts to remedy the situation, he should consider
resigning. Id.
28. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
29. Id.
30. See Arsht, supra note 3, at 94 n.5; Pease, supra note 21, at 69-76. For a criticism
of the duty of care formulation itself in light of the real world conduct of directors, see
generally Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984) [hereinafter Manning, Time for Reality].
31. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
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ware cases, as well, have adopted the gross negligence standard
as appropriate.3 2 The second part of the Aronson definition of
the business judgment rule is that directors are presumed to
have acted in "good faith." A director essentially meets this
standard by acting in the best interests of shareholders3 and
within the bounds of the law."' The third portion of the pre-
sumption is that directors act in the honest belief that a given
action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.35 This
component of the definition apparently contemplates a bona fide
regard for the interests of the corporation.
3 6
32. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
33. Directors who improperly attempt to keep themselves in office, putting their
own interests above those of the shareholders, do not meet the standard. See, e.g.,
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d
556 (Del. Ch. 1977); Baron v. Allied Artist Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975);
Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962); see also Pease, supra note 21, at
59. If the plaintiff can establish that directors authorized the transaction solely or pri-
marily to maintain themselves in office, the business judgment rule is inapplicable even
if the transaction is in the best interests of the corporation. If, however, the effect of
preserving control is merely incidental to a transaction that is otherwise in the best in-
terest of the corporation, the rule does apply. Arsht, supra note 3, at 128-29; see also
Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 24.
34. Directors who knowingly violate laws do not meet the good faith standard, even
if they believe that they are acting in the corporation's best interest. See Pease, supra
note 21, at 59; Guidelines for Directors, supra note 23, at 213.
35. The court in Aronson stated that "the business judgment rule operates only in
the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where directors have
either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision [to refrain], failed to
act." 473 A.2d at 813. "A conscious decision to refrain from acting," explained the court,
"may... be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule."
Id.; see also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963);
Pease, supra note 21, at 76-79. This distinction, however, is often overlooked. See, e.g.,
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 n.7; Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 19; Cohn, supra
note 2, at 604-05.
36. The court in Aronson cited Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 14 Del. Ch.
193, 126 A. 46 (1924), as support for its definition of the business judgment rule. 473
A.2d at 812. In Robinson the court stated that the law presumes the directors were "ac-
tuated in their conduct by a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation" and
that they "honestly believed that they were securing terms and conditions which were
expedient and for the corporation's best interests." Robinson, 14 Del. Ch. at -, 126 A.
at 48; accord Baron v. Pressed Metals of Am., 35 Del. Ch. 325, 117 A.2d 357 (1955);
Karasik v. Pacific E. Corp., 21 Del. Ch. 81, 180 A. 604 (1935); Mitchell v. Highland-W.
Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326, 167 A. 831 (1933); see also Pease, supra note 21, at 59-60.
Some respected commentators would use "reasonable" in place of "honest" as an
element of the presumption. See Arsht, supra note 3, at 111-12. Both the Model Acts
and the South Carolina Code use "reasonably" as a modifier of "believes." See RMBCA
11
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After discussing the three-fold presumption and the general
duty of care, the court in Aronson addressed the other primary
duty imposed upon corporate directors, the duty of loyalty. 7
§ 8.30(a)(3); MBCA § 35; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(a) (1976). The American Law Insti-
tute, on the other hand, supports the use of the phrase "rational basis" in place of Aron-
son's "honest belief" and the Model Acts' "reasonable belief" test. The ALI apparently
believes that the use of the term "rational" would allow directors wider discretion than
would a reasonableness standard. See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 27, at 63-64.
The Business Roundtable disagrees: "By making 'rational' basis an issue in every
case, the protection of the business judgment rule is substantially narrowed and, perhaps
more important, shareholder plaintiffs will always have a basis to demand discovery on
the merits of the decision." See Pease, supra note 21, at 61. Mr. Pease, himself, felt that
the phrase "good faith" could be substituted for "honest" in the Aronson presumption.
Id.
For a discussion of the differences, if any, between South Carolina's use of the term
"reasonably" and Delaware's use of the word "honest," see infra notes 135-43 and ac-
companying text.
37. The duty of loyalty must be distinguished from the duty to inform oneself,
which is in the nature of a duty of care. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. At
least one commentator has found the duty of loyalty to contain two components: a sub-
stantive element and a procedural element. See generally Ruder, supra note 12. The
substantive areas include self-dealing, dealings by a corporate parent with its subsidiar-
ies, majority shareholder injury to minority shareholders in corporate acquisition and
reorganization transactions, excessive compensation, the use of corporate funds to per-
petuate control, the sale of control at a premium, insider trading, usurpation of corporate
opportunities, competition by corporate officers and directors with their corporation, and
fiduciary obligations in bankruptcy. Id. Procedural considerations, stated in question
form, include the following: Was adequate disclosure made to the decision maker? Did
the alleged conflict of interest transaction receive independent scrutiny? Who has the
burden of proving that the duty of loyalty was breached? Is the transaction fair? Id.
The director's loyalty runs to the corporation and its shareholders and not to a dom-
inant shareholder or chief executive officer, since acting under the influence of such con-
trolling persons would "sterilize" the discretion of the board. 473 A.2d at 814. Thus,
independence, along with care and loyalty, might be viewed as a component of the busi-
ness judgment rule. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180 (Del. 1986). The court in Aronson explained this principle:
Independence means that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits
of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influ-
ences. While directors may confer, debate, and resolve their differences
through compromise, or by reasonable reliance upon the expertise of their col-
leagues and other qualified persons, the end result, nonetheless, must be that
each director has brought his or her own informed business judgment to bear
with specificity upon the corporate merits of the issues without regard for or
succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid business decision
into a faithless act.
473 A.2d at 816. The court then concluded that plaintiffs who allege domination and
control of one or more directors must, as a threshold matter, plead particularized facts
showing that wishes of the controlling person are being served. The mere fact that cer-
tain board members are large stockholders, however, "does not create a disqualifying
'personal pecuniary interest' to defeat the operation of the business judgment rule."
12
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This duty dictates that directors "can neither appear on both
sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial
benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a bene-
fit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders gen-
erally.""8 The protection of the business judgment rule can only
be claimed by disinterested directors who reach an impartial de-
cision and whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of the rule.39
Delaware courts subsequently have applied the Aronson
principles in numerous cases,4" and the Aronson restatement of
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (citation omitted).
38. 473 A.2d at 812. When a decision is tainted with self-interest or self-dealing, a
director may not have brought his "business judgment to bear on the matter." Brown &
Phillips, supra note 4, at 513 (emphasis in original). Self-dealing entails the receipt by a
director of some benefit from the corporation to the exclusion of and in detriment to the
other stockholders. See Sparks, Recent Developments in Substantive Business Judg-
ment Rule, 61 N.C.L. REV. 534, 537 (1983). If the director is himself a stockholder, self-
dealing occurs when he appropriates to himself some corporate benefit that he does not
share pro rata with other stockholders. Id.
When the party challenging board action establishes personal interest or self-dealing
on the part of one or more directors, the business judgment rule is rendered inapplicable
and a presumption of overreaching arises that can be overcome only if the defendants
can prove that the transaction was intrinsically fair to the corporation. Balotti, Finkel-
stein & Abrams, supra note 9, at 328-30; Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 20; see
also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating that "[wihen direc-
tors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the
bargain"); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952); Vea-
sey, Further Reflections on Court Review of Judgment of Directors: Is the Judicial Pro-
cess Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAW. 1373, 1378 (1985) [hereinafter Veasey, Further
Reflections].
39. 473 A.2d at 812. The court concluded that "if... director interest is present,
and the transaction is not approved by a majority consisting of the disinterested direc-
tors, then the business judgment rule has no application whatever in determining de-
mand futility." Id. The court acknowledged that "drawing the line on a majority of the
board may be an arguably arbitrary dividing point," but it concluded that, at least in
demand futility cases, the discretionary review by the court of chancery of complaints
alleging specific facts pointing to bias on a particular board would be sufficient for deter-
mining demand futility. Id. at 815 n.8. Presumably, the "majority rule" is not limited to
demand futility cases.
40. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984). The court
in Pogostin stated that a plaintiff, in order to overcome the business judgment rule and
prove demand futility, must demonstrate divided loyalties or personal financial benefit,
create a reasonable doubt that the directors' decision to reject the takeover proposal was
"an informed decision," or otherwise show "improper motive in a given set of circum-
stances, i.e., perpetuation of self in office or otherwise in control, was the sole or primary
purpose of the wrongdoer's conduct." Id. at 627.
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the business judgment rule represents the controlling interpreta-
tion of the rule in Delaware. As noted above, however, the courts
of Delaware have not always been uniform in their application of
the rule. For instance, shortly after the Aronson decision, the
Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery
handed down two separate, significant cases, reaching what ap-
peared to be contradicting decisions. A discussion of the busi-
ness judgment rule would be incomplete without a discussion of
these important decisions.
B. Smith v. Van Gorkom: A Rude Awakening for Corporate
Directors?
1. Holding and Discussion of Duty of Care
In Smith v. Van Gorkom41 the Delaware Supreme Court
"exploded a bomb."4 2 Prior to that decision, courts generally
In Pogostin the court held that the complaint did not overcome the presumption
that the board properly and prudently exercised its managerial discretion. The court
noted:
Valuation studies, carefully prepared by outsiders, were presented to the board
prior to its decision. A special committee of independent, outside directors was
charged with gathering and analyzing this information. There is nothing in the
complaint to suggest that the board's action was other than a carefully consid-
ered decision made on an informed basis.
Id.; see also Veasey, Further Reflections, supra note 38, at 1376. Naming directors as
defendants and making conclusory allegations of director wrongdoing will not suffice to
excuse a plaintiff shareholder from demanding board action in the absence of particular
allegations of participation, self-dealing, bias, bad faith, or corrupt motive on the part of
a majority of the directors. Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1114 (D.
Del. 1985).
41 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
42. Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) [hereinafter Manning, Life in the Boardroom]. Most
corporate attorneys and directors were shocked with the outcome of that case. As one
commentator summarized:
At first blush, the challenge to the merger must have seemed like a nuisance
action at best. The merger was negotiated at arm's length with no allegation
that the decision of the directors of Trans Union was tainted by conflict of
interest. Nor was there any challenge to the competence or experience of the
directors who approved the merger. The credentials of the five inside and five
outside directors were impeccable. Moreover, the rationale for the merger was
obvious. Trans Union for many years had investment tax credits that it could
not fully use. Prior attempts to obtain the benefit of these credits had failed.
The merger allowed the shareholders of Trans Union to sell the tax credits
that the firm otherwise could not use. Finally, the terms of the merger pro-
14
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held corporate directors to be shielded from personal liability for
business decisions.43 In Van Gorkom, however, the court, in a
three-to-two decision, held the directors of Trans Union Corpo-
ration personally liable when they agreed to sell the company
for about $688 million to the Marmon Group, a company con-
trolled by the Pritzker family of Chicago.44 The court concluded
that the directors had not exercised due care in deciding to rec-
ommend the cash-out merger4 5 and held them liable in damages
for the difference between the fair value of the stock of Trans
Union and the cash received by the Trans Union stockholders."
Specifically, the court held that the board's decision to approve
the proposed merger was not the product of an informed busi-
ness judgment, that the board's subsequent efforts to amend the
merger agreement and take other curative action were ineffec-
tual, and that the board did not deal in complete candor with
the stockholders because it failed to disclose all material facts
that it knew or should have known before securing the stock-
vided shareholders of Trans Union with $55 in cash for their shares which were
previously trading in the mid-$30's, a premium of approximately fifty percent.
The shareholders overwhelmingly approved the merger.
Fischel, supra note 18, at 1437. But see Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (enjoining the sale of a wholly owned
subsidiary, after finding gross negligence in the directors' approval of the sale during a
two-hour meeting held on one and one-half days' notice, without notification of the pur-
pose to outside directors, and without obtaining an appraisal of the value of the
subsidiary).
43. See Arsht, supra note 3, at 93-100; see also authority cited supra note 4.
44. 488 A.2d at 864.
45. Manning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 1. The court thus reversed
the decision of the court of chancery, which had granted judgment for the defendant
directors. The lower court held that the directors had acted in an informed manner,
entitling them to the protection of the business judgment rule, and that the shareholder
vote was "fairly informed" and should not be set aside. Id. The lower court cited the
following factors in support of its conclusion: (1) the premium paid (approximately $17)
over the market value of the stock; (2) the "business acumen" of the Trans Union direc-
tors; and (3) the lack of any other bids for the stock.
Justices McNeilly and Christie of the Delaware Supreme Court dissented from the
finding that the Trans Union directors had been grossly negligent. These justices argued
that the Trans Union directors exercised proper business judgment and disclosed all ma-
terial facts to the shareholders. 488 A.2d at 893 (McNeilly, J., dissenting); id. at 898-99
(Christie, J., dissenting). Justice McNeilly stressed the credentials and combined experi-
ence of the board members and concluded: "Directors of this caliber are not ordinarily
taken in by a 'fast shuffle.'" Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). For a thorough criti-
cism of the majority holding in Van Gorkom, see generally Fischel, supra note 18.
46. 488 A.2d at 893.
15
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holders' approval of the merger.,"
In discussing the business judgment rule, the court repeated
the Aronson language that the rule is "a presumption that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
4 8
The Van Gorkom decision rested primarily on the first of these
presumptions, the duty of directors to inform themselves "prior
to making a business decision of all material information reason-
ably available to them. '49 The court flatly stated that, under the
business judgment rule, there is no protection for directors who
have made "an unintelligent or unadvised judgment.
50
The director's duty to exercise an informed judgment, ex-
plained the court, derives from his fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.51 This obligation, which does not toler-
ate faithlessness or self-dealing, requires more than the mere
absence of bad faith or fraud. Rather, the director has an affirm-
ative duty to protect shareholder interests and to proceed with a
critical eye in assessing information. 2 The court stated that a
47. Id. at 864. In discussing the directors' breach of their fiduciary duty of candor to
the stockholders, the court enumerated several material deficiencies in the proxy state-
ment issued by the Trans Union directors. For instance, the board failed to disclose its
own lack of valuation information and did not provide a complete and true recital of the
events leading up to the meeting at which it voted to approve the merger. Id. at 890-92.
It also mischaracterized the nature of the $55 per share price by failing to reveal that
this price was the result of a "search for ways to justify a price in connection with" a
leveraged buy-out transaction, rather than a determination of what the shares were
worth. Id. at 891. The board also referred to a "substantial" premium that shareholders
would receive without disclosing the board's failure to assess the premium offered in
terms of relevant valuation techniques, which rendered its determination questionable in
light of the admittedly depressed stock market price. Id. Moreover, the board issued a
supplemental proxy statement of "new" information, much of which was known or rea-
sonably available at the time of the original proxy statement. Id.
48. 488 A.2d at 872.
49. Id. The court in Van Gorkom thus analyzed the decisionmaking process rather
than the decision resulting from that process. See Veasey, New Insights, supra note 1.
50. 488 A.2d at 872; see also Sparks, supra note 38, at 535.
51. 488 A.2d at 872.
52. Id. A director may not abdicate this duty by leaving to the shareholders alone
the decision to approve or disapprove a given transaction. Id. at 873. The delegation of
decisions to shareholders must be distinguished, however, from the delegation of a task
to an expert or one otherwise in a position to render advice. In Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985), for example, the court stated:
An informed decision to delegate a task is as much an exercise of business
judgment as any other. The realities of modern corporate life are such that
16
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director's duty to inform himself is in the nature of a duty of
care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty, and it repeated the
Aronson conclusion that the standard of care is predicated upon
concepts of gross negligence.
53
In Van Gorkom there were no allegations of fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing, nor was there proof thereof. Thus, the di-
rectors were presumed to have acted in good faith and on an
informed basis.54 The court, however, found various instances of
"grossly negligent" behavior that rebutted these presumptions.
For example, at their meeting of September 20, 1980, the direc-
tors approved a fifty-five dollar per share offer after only two
hours of consideration, without prior notice, and without the ex-
igency of a crisis or emergency.55 The board based its approval
on a twenty-minute oral presentation by the chief executive of-
ficer, Van Gorkom, without ever having seen a copy of the
merger agreement or even a written summary of the terms of the
merger.56 The board had only Van Gorkom's statement of his
directors cannot be expected to manage the day to day activities of a company.
This is recognized by the provisions of [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983)]
that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed "by or
under the direction" of its board. In setting its agenda as to the matters in
which it will be directly involved, and those it will delegate, a board's decisions
in those areas are entitled to equal consideration as exercises of business
judgment.
Id. at 943 (citations omitted). In Rosenblatt the court upheld the delegation of subsur-
face asset valuation to DeGolyer & MacNaughton (D & M), a respected engineering firm
engaged in supplying independent estimates of the worth of oil and gas properties. Id. at
942-43. The court stated that there was no proof that D & M lacked independence or
was in any way beholden to either party. Id. at 943. Therefore, the court concluded that
D & M had the requisite reputation and experience to assist Getty and Skelly Oil. Id.
53. 488 A.2d at 872-73.
54. Id. at 873.
55. Id. at 874. Most corporate directors and attorneys probably did not consider this
behavior to constitute "gross negligence" and would regard two hours' consideration of a
plan together with reliance on a corporate officer's recommendation as being prudent
business behavior. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. The court held that the presentation was not a report within the meaning of
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983), which protects directors who rely in good faith on
reports of officers. 488 A.2d at 875. Moreover, the board's reliance on Van Gorkom's
presentation alone violated the warning in Aronson that a director must bring "his or
her own informed judgment to bear with specificity upon the corporate merits of the
issues without regard for or succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid
business decision into a faithless act." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816; see also supra note 37.
The Van Gorkom court, however, denied that it was suggesting that a board "must read
in haec verba every contract or legal document which it approves" and stated that there
need only be "some credible contemporary evidence demonstrating that the directors
17
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understanding of the substance of the agreement. Neither Van
Gorkom nor any board member had ever read the document it-
self.57 Moreover, the directors did not adequately inform them-
selves of Van Gorkom's role in arranging the sale and purchase
price,58 the intrinsic value of the corporation, or the adequacy of
the price offered.59 They neither consulted with an investment
banker nor sought documentation to support the fifty-five dollar
per share price. The directors also failed to consider relevant in-
formation at their meeting of October 8, 1980, at which they ap-
proved certain amendments to the merger agreement without
ever having seen the amendments in writing. 0 Nevertheless,
Van Gorkom executed the amendments without conferring fur-
ther with the board.
On these facts, the court concluded that the directors had
behaved in a grossly negligent manner, both in approving the
merger agreement and in adopting the subsequent amendments.
It held that the business judgment rule did not shield the direc-
tors from personal liability since they had failed to exercise the
informed business judgment required under the Aronson formu-
lation of the rule.61 The court assessed damages as the amount
knew what they were doing, and ensured that their purported action was given effect."
488 A.2d at 833 n.25.
57. 488 A.2d at 875. During the trial, the defendants were unable to produce or
identify the original merger agreement. Id. at 878. The court concluded that the defend-
ants' unexplained failure to produce this document "permits the logical inferences that
the instrument would not support their assertions" regarding Trans Union's authority to
receive competitive proposals. Id.
58. 483 A.2d at 874. Van Gorkom conceived the idea of a merger and approached
Pritzker with a per share price proposal. Id. at 866.
59. 488 A2d at 874.
60. Id. at 883. The actual amendments were not drafted until some time after this
meeting, and, when drafted, they differed materially from the proposed form approved
by the directors.
61. Id. at 872 (emphasis added). The defendants argued that the following factors
demonstrated that the board's decision was informed:
(1) the magnitude of the premium or spread between the $55 Pritzker offering
price and Trans Union's current market price of $38 per share; (2) the amend-
ment of the Agreement as submitted on September 20 to permit the Board to
accept any better offer during the "market test" period; (3) the collective expe-
rience and expertise of the Board's "inside" and "outside" directors; and (4)
their reliance on Brennan's legal advice that directors might be sued if they
rejected the Pritzker proposal.
Id. at 875.
An analogous case is Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). In Ro-
senblatt, which was decided several months after Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme
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by which the fair value of Trans Union exceeded fifty-five dol-
lars per share and remanded for a determination of the fair
value of the shares represented by the plaintiff's class. The valu-
ation was to be based upon the intrinsic value of Trans Union
on September 20, 1980, the date upon which the merger was ap-
proved. 2 The defendant directors subsequently settled out of
Court held that the approval of the merger proposal by the Getty and Skelly Oil boards
was made on an informed basis. Id. at 939. The court noted that the Skelly directors
were fully briefed by the investment banking firms of Smith Barney Harris Upham &
Company and Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Company. Their reports were based on copies of
valuation books prepared and distributed by the two investment banks. The directors
had seen copies of the proxy statement prior to the meeting. The board also received a
legal opinion on the merger, as well as copies of the final estimate prepared by DeGolyer
and MacNaughton, a Dallas, Texas petroleum engineering firm with an outstanding rep-
utation. The directors also heard from the attorney representing Gruss, the Skelly share-
holder who had been threatening suit since May 1976. Additionally, certain Skelly direc-
tors, including one outside director who controlled more stock than the plaintiff class,
questioned Getty representatives and Getty management on the fairness of the exchange
ratio. Following this discussion, three Skelly directors, who were also Getty and Mission
officers, were excused from the Skelly board meeting. An outside director then moved to
approve the proposed merger ratio, and the resolution was unanimously adopted. At the
Getty board meeting, Getty's directors were given a similar, in-depth briefing on the
proposed merger before voting to approve it. Id.
62. 488 A.2d at 893. Bayless Manning criticized the court's use of the phrase "intrin-
sic value," stating as follows:
Something must be said about the court's talk about the "intrinsic value" of
the Trans Union stock. It is disappointing to see a modern court, especially a
commercially oriented Delaware court, lapse into anachronistic language of
"true value," as though we have learned nothing from 150 years of market
economy analytics. And one wonders just how the lower court on remand will
go about determining the "intrinsic value" of the Trans Union stock to set the
benchmark for the directors' liability....
... Perhaps the term to describe that measure of value [i.e., damages]
should have been "as-if market value"-the price that would have eventuated
from an open auction. If, as I believe, "as-if market value" is what the court
means by its term "intrinsic value," while the standard is certainly difficult to
apply, it is not quite accurate to say that the court reverted to discredited
economic theology of "real value."
Second-and here is a practical lesson-the materials sent to shareholders
by the directors stated in just so many words that the book value of the stock
was less than "the intrinsic value of the Company's assets," and that the price
of common stock on the market did not reflect "the inherent value of the Com-
pany." The quoted language was a direct invitation to a plaintiff to sue, and an
invitation to the court to set a damages benchmark--and both invitations were
taken up. The court also used the same quoted language to argue that the
board purported to know what the "intrinsic value" was-but in fact had not
tried to find out....
Manning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 4 (emphasis in original).
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court for $23.5 million.63
2. The Real Winners and Losers in Van Gorkom
The Van Gorkom decision drew immediate and widespread
attention. Commentators generally predicted negative effects,
many of which came to pass. The most obvious of these effects
were the exodus of corporate directors and the inability of cor-
porations to recruit new directors, particularly outside direc-
tors. 4 The increased likelihood of suits caused an increase in the
cost of directors' liability insurance and a decrease in the availa-
bility of such coverage.6 5 It was feared that this phenomenon
63. Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1985, at 18, col. 2. The company was insured for only $10
million. Thus, the directors were held personally liable for $13.5 million. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 1987, at 31, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). Ultimately, the Pritzker family paid this difference.
Id.
64. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1985, at 46, col. 1. While these effects were felt primarily in
Delaware, where the Van Gorkom decision was controlling, they were also felt across the
nation because of the large number of corporations incorporated in Delaware and be-
cause of the respect generally accorded to the Delaware Supreme Court on corporate
matters. Directors of major companies receiving average annual fees of $24,000, were
weighing the benefits of being corporate directors against the potential liability; for
many, it did not add up. Id. at col. 3. In response to this problem, many companies now
offer higher fees, stock options, and other perquisites in an effort to keep directors happy
"even as the risk of lawsuits keeps them awake." Id.; see also Brown & Phillips, supra
note 4, at 507-08 ("[A] strict standard of liability for directors may deter capable persons
from serving as directors: If one shoots the piano player for hitting a sour note, it may
not be easy to find someone else to take his place.").
65. Manning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 6. Soaring insurance claims
have forced some underwriters to raise premiums for directors' insurance, reduce the
face amount of policies, and cancel coverage for lawsuit-prone companies. NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 5, 1985, at 46, col. 3. The companies that can still get insurance face a double blow.
coverage has been cut dramatically (from as much as $50 to $150 million in 1985 to $10
to $35 million as of March 1986), while premiums paid for even the reduced coverage
have increased substantially. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at 29, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). A recent
account observed the following:
A sharp contraction in the availability of directors' and officers' liability insur-
ance (D & 0) has occurred in the last year. In 1984, brokers could choose from
well over 30 carriers, and limits of up to $200 million were available. Today
there are only a handful of D & 0 insurers, and industry representatives say
$50 million in coverage is a realistic maximum in standard market coverage.
Premiums have escalated, with rate increases of 200[%] to 1,000[%]. Many
corporations cannot find coverage for their boards at any price. Industries that
are not favorites with underwriters include financial institutions, high tech,
utilities, real estate, petrochemicals, steel, and insurance.
Policies that are being written today contain more restrictions than was
typical a few years ago. Instead of a three-year policy, one-year terms with a
stated expiration date are standard. Carriers are requiring higher corporate
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would thwart the decade-old drive to create boards that were
independent of management,66 a result contrary to the pluralis-
tic objectives usually sought by those who argue for more strin-
gent liability standards for directors.
6 7
A related effect feared in the aftermath of Van Gorkom was
a decrease in the amount of risk-taking by those corporate direc-
tors who continue to serve.6 8 Since the Van Gorkom decision
held directors personally liable for monetary damages, it was
feared that directors might attempt to minimize their exposure
by avoiding transactions and decisions for which they might
likely be sued.69 Thus, not only will they be less willing to serve,
but when they do serve, they may be less entrepreneurial, tend
to overinvest in information,7 0 and consult and employ outside
experts more often than necessary in order to avoid liability.
These precautionary measures would function as a judicially im-
posed tax on corporate transactions, diminishing the returns to
shareholders.7 1 Ironically, shareholders may thus be viewed as
the real losers in Van Gorkom, and although the court held for
the shareholders on the facts of that case, the ultimate effect of
and individual deductibles and some underwriters have reimposed the 5[%]
participation clause on the corporation reimbursement side of the policy. The
following exclusions are common: pending and prior litigation, takeover activ-
ity, insured [versus] insured, and, for financial institutions, regulatory activity.
Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute, supra note 19, at 1. Insurers, however,
defend their behavior by pointing out that, recently, many insurance companies have
paid out three to four times as much in claims as they collected in premiums.
When no insurer will provide coverage, one solution is self-insurance, which can be
provided either through a captive subsidiary or by creating an insurance consortium with
several companies. N.Y. Times, supra, col. 1. Many states, however, including Delaware,
forbid corporations to indemnify board members for damages sustained in certain law-
suits because the shareholders who prevail in those suits should not be paid out of corpo-
rate funds. Id. at 31, col. 3. Thus, courts may view self-insurance as inappropriate. Id.
Indeed, from tax and accounting standpoints, it can be argued that self-insurance is not
really insurance at all, but a form of reserve funds. Id.
Delaware has recently responded to the phenomenon of escalating insurance costs
by passing legislation that permits shareholders to limit directors' personal liability for
monetary damages arising out of due care violations. See infra notes 110-18 and accom-
panying text.
66. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1985, at 46, col. 1; see also Veasey & Finkelstein, New Dela-
ware Statute, supra note 19, at 1-2.
67. Manning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 6.
68. Fischel, supra note 18, at 1453.
69. Id. at 1453-54.
70. Id. at 1454.
71. Id. at 1453.
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the decision could be a general decrease in shareholder profits. 2
The big winners in Van Gorkom are investment bankers
and outside consultants.73 Although Van Gorkom did not re-
quire that directors always obtain a fairness letter or other
outside documentation before voting upon a fundamental corpo-
rate change, such documentation would better enable directors
to prove that their vote upon a given issue was reasoned and
informed, if board action were challenged. Indeed, the decision
in Van Gorkom apparently encourages the participation of
outside consultants in corporate decisionmaking as a form of in-
surance, and directors probably will be willing to spend corpo-
rate funds to obtain this protection rather than risk personal lia-
bility for making an "uninformed" decision.
In light of the above-mentioned considerations, Van
Gorkom appears to conflict with the basic rationale behind the
business judgment rule itself,75 which recognizes that neither
judges76 nor shareholders77 should be allowed to substitute their
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 488 A.2d at 876. The court stated:
We do not imply that an outside valuation study is essential to support an
informed business judgment; nor do we state that fairness opinions by inde-
pendent investment bankers are required as a matter of law. Often insiders
familiar with the business of a going concern are in a better position than any
outsiders to gather relevant information; and under appropriate circumstances,
such directors may be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the valua-
tion reports of their management.
Id. Thus, it would be an overstatement to view Van Gorkom as "the Investment Bank-
ers' Relief Act of 1985, requiring that boards of directors must henceforth get an invest-
ment banker's 'fairness' opinion on every valuation transaction." Manning, Life in the
Boardroom, supra note 42, at 3 (emphasis in original). The decision, however, can be
viewed as highlighting "the critical need for the retention of independent experts and for
careful preparation and documentation in connection with handling takeover proposals."
Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update,
40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1410 (1985).
75. See generally Fischel, supra note 18.
76. Id. at 1439; see also Brown & Phillips, supra note 4, at 507-08. The basic ration-
ale behind the business judgment rule is that businessmen, rather than judges, are better
able to make business decisions, and the "substitution of a judge's or jury's notion of
what is reasonable (after the fact) for that of a corporate director (before the fact) runs
counter to society's traditional encouragement offered to the creative entrepreneur."
Veasey & Manning, supra note 2, at 932. Indeed, there is no way for courts to define the
precise level of information that a director must acquire before making a business deci-
sion. Fischel, supra note 18, at 1441. Not only would the level vary from company to
company and decision to decision, but courts have the advantage of hindsight, whereas
directors must make judgment calls during the negotiation of a business deal. When di-
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judgment for that of corporate directors. Subsequent cases, how-
ever, have shown that the Van Gorkom decision did not signal
the end of judicial deference to board decisions. For instance,
some of the fears raised by Van Gorkom were put to rest by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household International,
Inc.
7
8
C. Moran v. Household International: The Calm After the
Storm
1. The Holding
The Delaware Court of Chancery's opinion in Moran v.
Household International, Inc.7 1 addressed a challenge to the
adoption by the board of directors of Household International,
Inc. (Household) of a "poison pill" 0 preferred stock rights divi-
rectors must weigh the cost of additional expenditures against the value of the additional
information that must be gained, it is difficult to know exactly how much is enough. Id;
see also Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judg-
ment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187, 1189 (1986).
The Guidebook states in pertinent part:
Recognizing that, consistent with the business corporation's profit orientation,
business judgment inevitably involves risk evaluation and assumption, and rec-
ognizing that the office of corporate director, as such, does not require fulltime
commitment to the affairs of the enterprise, the corporate director frequently
makes important decisions which may eventually prove to be erroneous. A di-
rector exercising his good faith judgment may be protected from liability to his
corporation under the Business Judgment Rule.... Recognizing that business
decisions may seem simply [sic] when viewed with hindsight, and expressing
reluctance to substitute their judgment for that of directors, courts have gener-
ally refrained from questioning the wisdom of board decisions.
Guidebook, supra note 11, at 1603-04.
77. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
78. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
79. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985). Ironically, the court of chancery decided Moran
in favor of the corporate directors on the same day that Van Gorkom was decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court.
80. A "poison pill" is a defensive device that dilutes the value of a company or in-
creases its debt to make it a less attractive target to an unwanted suitor. See Block,
Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 56. In other words, a poison pill rights plan is "a plan
by which shareholders receive the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substan-
tial premium on the occurrence of a stated triggering event." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986). A review of the various
defensive mechanisms that may be adopted by directors to prevent takeovers is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the application of the business judgment
rule to defensive strategies other than the poison pill (e.g., greenmail, golden parachutes,
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dend plan.81 The Household board purportedly enacted the plan
to protect the corporation against takeover attempts. The plain-
tiff, however, a former Household director, alleged that the plan
was designed solely for the entrenchment of management, that it
arbitrarily restricted the marketability of shares, 2 and that it
impermissibly limited the ability of shareholders to engage in
proxy contests.8 " Vice Chancellor Walsh, writing for the court,
however, rejected the plaintiff's claims and found that the adop-
tion of the plan was a legitimate and informed exercise of mana-
gerial judgment under the business judgment rule. e4 The court
observed that the board had acted upon information showing
that Household was vulnerable to a two-tier takeover"5 and upon
shark repellant amendments), see Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 37-72; Lerner
& Burke, The Application of the Business Judgment Rule to Corporate Defensive Ac-
tions, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, OFFICERS' AND DIREcTORs' LiALrry: A REvIEw OF
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 379, 399-423 (1985); NAT'L L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 21-23. See
generally Rosenzweig & Orens, Tipping the Scales-The Business Judgment Rule in
the Antitakeover Context, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 23 (1986).
81. Household's rights plan allowed a director to issue one right for each outstand-
ing share to shareholders. The rights entitled their holders to purchase 1/100 share of a
new, nonredeemable series of preferred stock. Additionally, if a hostile suitor were to
acquire at least 20% in Household, shareholders had the right to purchase shares in that
company at half price. If they exercised that right, they would thus dilute the acquiror's
capital. See 490 A.2d at 1066; see also Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 9, at 57-58.
For a detailed discussion of the rights plan adopted by the Household board, see Rosen-
zweig & Orens, supra note 80, at 24-25.
82. The court recognized that the plan had an indirect effect on the alienability of
shares by deterring prospective purchasers who wished to pursue a hostile two-tier
tender offer, but it held this impact "sustainable, within the parameters of the business
judgment rule." 490 A.2d at 1082.
For additional information regarding offensive and defensive tactics that can be em-
ployed in tender offer, see generally E. ARANOw, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOP-
MENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-99 (1977); A. FLEISCHER, TENDER
OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 291-396 (1983); M. LIPTON & E. STEIN-
BERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS §§ 51.01-17 (1984); 1 ALI/ABA Resource Materials,
Takeover Defenses and Director's Liabilities (M. Lipton ed. 1986).
One should note that when reacting to a tender offer, a company, through its direc-
tors, must notify its shareholders within 10 days whether it "(1) [r]ecommends accept-
ance or rejection of the bidder's tender offer; (2) [e]xpresses no opinion and is remaining
neutral toward the bidder's offer; or (3) [i]s unable to take a position with respect to the
bidder's tender offer." Securities Exchange Commission rule 14e-2(a), 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-2(a) (1)-(3) (1986) (promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982 & Supp. I 1983 & Supp. II 1985)).
83. See 490 A.2d at 1082-83.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1077-79.
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documentation setting forth the particulars of the plan itself.86
On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed the chancery court, holding that the directors were au-
thorized to adopt the plan, that the plan did not usurp the
rights of the stockholders to receive tender offers by changing
the corporation's fundamental structure, and that the adoption
of the plan was a legitimate exercise of business judgment.87 The
court distinguished Moran from earlier cases involving the busi-
ness judgment rule on the ground that Moran concerned the
adoption of a defensive mechanism to ward off possible hostile
advances in the future, rather than one adopted in reaction to a
specific threat.88 It reasoned that this distinguishing factor made
application of the rule even more appropriate since preplanning
for the contingency of a hostile takeover may reduce the risk
that management would fail to exercise reasonable judgment
under the pressure of a takeover bid. 9
After repeating the Aronson definition of the business judg-
ment rule, the court discussed the proper burdens of proof ap-
plicable to the adoption of defensive mechanisms:
[W]hen the business judgment rule applies to adoption of a de-
fensive mechanism, the initial burden will lie with the direc-
tors. The directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and ef-
fectiveriess existed.... [T]hey satisfy that burden "by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation ... ." In addition the
directors must show that the defensive mechanism was reason-
able in relation to the threat posed. Moreover, that proof is
86. Id. at 1083.
87. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Joseph T. Walsh, the
vice chancellor who authored the lower court opinion in Moran, was a justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court at the time this decision was rendered. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1985, at D5, col. 4 (nat'l ed.). It is interesting to note that Moran, in which the directors'
actions were upheld, addressed a hostile takeover attempt, whereas Van Gorkom, in
which liability was imposed on the director, addressed a friendly takeover approved by
the shareholders. See Rosenzweig & Orens, supra note 80, at 30.
88. 500 A.2d at 1350.
89. Id.; cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa v. Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Although corpo-
rate directors generally act under the protection of the business judgment rule, both in
prospective measures and in reactive measures, in seeking to ward off a threatened hos-
tile takeover, corporate action that seeks to undo a takeover bid after control has already
passed to another group is not protected by the business judgment rule. See Frantz Mfg.
Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
1987]
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materially enhanced... where, as here, a majority of the board
favoring the proposal consisted of outside independent direc-
tors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing stan-
dards. Then, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs who have
the ultimate burden of persuasion to show a breach of the di-
rectors' fiduciary duties.90
The court concluded that the Household board adequately met
its burden by demonstrating that the adoption of the rights plan
was in reaction to a perceived threat in the market place of coer-
cive two-tier tender offers. 9 ' The court found that the board rea-
sonably believed that Household was vulnerable to coercive ac-
quisition since the record reflected the board's concern over the
90. 500 A.2d at 1356 (citiations omitted). Household is merely one case in the recent
trilogy addressing the application of the business judgment rule to the adoption of de-
fensive mechanisms by the board of directors of a target corporation. See NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 3, 1936, at 21, col. 1. The Delaware Supreme Court, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985), clearly established that the rule's protection is available in such situations only if
the board shows: (1) reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed; (2) that its actions were primarily in fulfillment of its duty to
protect the corporation; and (3) that the defensive measure met the "balance" require-
ment-i.e., that it was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. NAT'L L.J., Nov. 3,
1986, at 21, col. 1. The court in Unocal stated that the determination of whether a defen-
sive measure is reasonable in relation to the threat posed entails an analysis by the direc-
tors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise. 493 A.2d
at 955. Examples of such concerns may include: the inadequacy of the price offered, the
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies"
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the com-
munity generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being of-
fered in the exchange. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, however, stressed
that "while concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a
takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some ration-
ally related benefit accruing to the shareholders." 506 A.2d at 176. The court found no
such benefits on the facts of that case. Id. The Revlon holding, however, did not render
lock-up and no-shop provisions illegal per se. Rather, such provisions are impermissible
in takeover situations in which a board's primary duty has become that of an auctioneer
responsible for selling the company to the highest bidder. Id. at 184. In such a situation,
market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's shareholders the
best price available for their equity. Id. As the court in Revlon stated:
Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might
be justifiable when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but
when bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company be-
comes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by
playing favorites with the contending factions.
Id.
91. 500 A.2d at 1357.
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increasing frequency of "boot-strap" and "bust-up" takeovers as
well as two-tier offers.92 Furthermore, the board was aware of
Moran's overture on behalf of Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corpora-
tion to acquire Household in a leveraged buy-out because
Household's stock was significantly undervalued in relation to
the company's break-up value. Thus, the court concluded that
the adoption of the rights plan was reasonable in relation to the
specific threat posed.93
The court then held that the plaintiff had failed to meet his
burden of showing a breach of duty by the board. The plaintiff
made no allegations of bad faith or self-interest on the part of
the directors. His primary contention was that the board did not
exercise an informed business judgment. 94 The plaintiff con-
tended, inter alia, that the directors were uninformed since they
had been told that the plan would not inhibit a proxy contest
and were not told that it would preclude all hostile takeover at-
tempts. The court, however, concluded that the plan would not
preclude all hostile acquisitions and that the directors were not
misinformed.
9 5
Reaffirming its position in Aronson and Van Gorkom, the
court stated that gross negligence is the proper standard to use
in determining whether a board of directors reached an in-
formed judgment on a given set of facts.9 6 The court then con-
cluded that the Household directors had not behaved in a
grossly negligent manner in adopting the rights plan since they
were supplied, at the time of their meeting, with information
setting forth the essentials of the plan, including a description of
the triggering events, the issue price and dividend rights of the
preferred stock, the "flip-over" effect of the rights plan and its
consequent dilution of a hostile acquiror's capital, and the
redeemability of the rights prior to a triggering event.
97
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1356. The court was thus able to avoid the potential breach of loyalty
issues presented by the facts.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court stated that the actions of the Household board were "clearly dis-
tinguishable from the actions of the directors of Trans Union Corporation who displayed
gross negligence in approving a cash-out merger." Id.
97. Id.; cf. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1076 (court of chancery arrived at a similar conclu-
sion, finding good faith supported judgment for directors). For a discussion of "flip-in"
rights, as opposed to "flip-over" rights, see Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F.
1987]
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Moreover, not only did the directors receive a three-page
summary of the plan along with articles on the current takeover
environment, but they also engaged in a full and candid evalua-
tion of the plan during which Moran, the plaintiff in the later
suit, presented them with a knowledgeable critique of the plan."
Thus the directors made an informed, reasoned business deci-
sion after being adequately briefed from competing perspectives.
The court, therefore, found that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate any breach of fiduciary duties, and it held that the
directors were entitled to the benefit of the business judgment
rule in their adoption of the rights plan.99
The court pointed out, however, that the "ultimate response
to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the [d]irectors' ac-
tions at that time, and nothing we say here relieves them of
their basic fundamental duties to the corporation and its stock-
holders. Their use of the [p]lan will be evaluated when and if
the issue arises."100
Supp. 1229, 1232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding rights plan adopted by takeover target's
board of directors held ultra vires under New Jersey law and invalid because of the "flip-
in" provisions that discriminated among shareholders of the same class and series; by
parties' stipulation, business judgment questions were not addressed); see also Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S.Ct. 258
(1986).
98. 500 A.2d at 1356.
99. Id. at 1357.
100. Id. (citations omitted). This limitation on the directors' discretion can be even
more clearly seen if one reads Moran in conjunction with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon the directors of Revlon, Inc.
(Revlon) rebuffed offers by Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry Pride) to acquire Revlon and
voted to adopt a two-part poison pill program as a defensive mechanism. The Revlon
board also courted and granted many concessions to a white knight, Forstmann Little &
Company, including: (1) the allowance of a "lock-up" option, whereby Forstmann Little
could acquire two of Revlon's health aid divisions for a price at least $75 million below
the lowest estimate of Revlon's own investment banker; and (2) the allowance of a "no-
shop" provision, which prevented the Revlon board from entertaining further bids from
any third party, including Pantry Pride, and ended the negotiating role that the board
had used as its initial rationale for its poison pill devices. Id. at 176-79.
In reviewing the actions of the board, the court in Revlon found the poison pin
rights plan adopted by the Revlon board to be acceptable. The court concluded that its
adoption fell within the business judgment rule as a prospective device calculated to
strengthen the board's bargaining position. The court noted that the board relied in part
upon the advice of its investment banker, who opined that Pantry Pride would finance
its tender offer with "junk bonds" and then sell Revlon's divisions separately to pay the
financing and make a profit. Id. at 177. According to the investment banker, Pantry
Pride's offer was grossly inadequate in light of the amount that Revlon could expect to
receive if it sold its divisions separately.
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2. Analysis of the Decision
The Delaware Supreme Court apparently used Moran to re-
affirm the viability of the business judgment rule.101 Alterna-
tively, it could have used Moran as a vehicle to deliver a lecture
on director self-interest in much the same way that it used Van
Gorkom to provide a general exegesis on gross negligence. 10 2 In
light of the criticism of Van Gorkom, however, the court appar-
ently believed that the "patient [could not] survive two serious
operations so close together."'103 Instead, the court found it more
prudent simply to swallow the Household "poison pill" and de-
fer to managerial discretion in a situation in which the board
could provide documentation sufficient to show that it was ade-
quately informed about the matter under consideration.
In so holding, the court managed to square the Van Gorkom
decision with existing judicial interpretations of the business
The court then noted, however, that once the Revlon board authorized management
to negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party, it became apparent to all that the
break-up and sale of the company was inevitable. According to the court:
The duty of the board thus had changed from the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for
the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities
under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid.
The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.
Id. at 182.
Consequently, the court stated that the Revlon board was wrong to permit consider-
ations other than price to dictate its approach and to favor one bidder (Forstmann Lit-
tle) over another (Pantry Pride). Id. By agreeing to lock-up and no-shop clauses, which
were in exchange for protecting the rights of noteholders, the board breached is fiduciary
duty of loyalty to the shareholders. Id. at 182. The court then noted that, because the
notes accepted by the holders specifically contemplated a waiver to permit the sale of the
company at a fair price, nothing remained for the board legitimately to protect. Thus,
the merger agreement with Forstmann was unreasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Id. at 184; cf. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the Fruehauf directors "unreasonably preferred incumbent management in the bidding
process-acting without objectivity and requisite loyalty to the corporation. Their ac-
tions were not taken in a good faith effort to negotiate the best deal for the
shareholders").
101. For a criticism of Moran as having gone too far in widening the protection
afforded by the business judgment rule, see generally Rosenzweig & Orens, supra note
80.
102. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 882-84 (Del. 1985).
103. Manning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 5.
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judgment rule. It is now clear that the court in Van Gorkom did
not abandon the business judgment rule and substitute its own
judgment for that of the Trans Union board. Instead, it simply
refused to apply the rule,10 concluding that the directors failed
to make an informed business judgment. After examining the
process by which the decision was made, the court in Van
Gorkom concluded that the directors acted in a manner not in
keeping with the presumptions underlying the business judg-
ment rule.105 Consequently, that rule could not operate to shield
the directors from personal liability.
This limitation is entirely reasonable since shareholders
should expect directors to perform diligently the functions for
which they were selected.106 Perhaps the lesson to be learned
from Van Gorkom is that directors, having been given considera-
104. Bus. WK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 56, col. 2.
105. See id. at 4. This analysis is in keeping with the basic premise underlying the
business judgment rule: the court should examine the decisionmaking process, not the
merits of the decision itself. See supra note 1. A critic of the Van Gorkom decision
however, could argue that the court's language regarding the decisionmaking process was
simply a guise to cover their substantive displeasure. The type of decision at issue may
well influence how the criteria within the business judgment rule will be applied. Man-
ning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 5. As Mr. Manning has explained:
Our corporation laws grant to directors exclusive power, or primary power,
or shared power to decide most enterprise issues and many ownership claim
issues. Currently no language in judicial opinions supports the following state-
ment, but one may predict that the standards of stringency of care (and loy-
alty) that will be applied by the courts with respect to the business judgment
rule as it ultimately develops will differentiate across a spectrum between "en-
terprise issues" and "ownership claim issues." Directors will find that they will
have little to fear from judicial Monday morning quarterbacking on a board's
decision, for example, to expand the company's slide rule business, even if it
soon becomes clear that the decision was ruinously wrong. But when the ques-
tion before the board directly involves shares-the personal property of the
shareholders-when it considers, for example, stock issuance, redemption,
cashout, reverse split, merger, and the like, the corporate lawyer had better
emphasize that those matters are very close to a nerve, and that the directors
would be well advised to be more than usually alert, deliberative, focused, pre-
pared, counseled, paper-tracked, and generally professional in their behavior.
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). Mr. Manning noted that it was "no accident that the
court chose a cashout merger case for the lecture it delivered in the Van Gorkom opin-
ion. The particular issue before the Trans Union board was the single most sensitive
'ownership claim' issue of all: the price to be paid to the shareholder for his stock." Id.;
see also Veasey, Further Reflections, supra note 38, at 1374.
106. This limitation, highlighted in Van Gorkom, merely echoes earlier interpreta-
tions of the business judgment rule. See Sparks, supra note 38, at 535; Veasey, New
Insights, supra note 1, at 1464.
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ble protection under the Aronson presumptions, must pay the
price for this judicial deference by tending to corporate matters
in a deliberate manner. 10 7 This interpretation of Van Gorkom
reinforces the view that directors must live up to the standards
imposed upon them by the twin duties of care and loyalty before
they may seek refuge behind the business judgment rule. 10 8
This reading of Van Gorkom, when appraised in conjunc-
tion with Moran and other Delaware cases, provides a coherent,
consistent, and straightforward explanation of the business judg-
ment rule. The fear generated in the aftermath of Van Gorkom
should, to a large extent, be put to rest. Directors should neither
resign nor be overly cautious in taking business risks. The pro-
tection provided by the business judgment rule will be available
as long as those directors examine the fundamentals of any
transaction upon which they are voting, weigh competing views,
and reach a reasoned, informed decision. 109
D. Statutory Revisions
The Delaware legislature recently amended its corporate
code to provide a mechanism by which further comfort might be
provided to directors. In the summer of 1986, the Delaware Leg-
islature enacted section 102(b)(7), 110 which permits shareholders
to include in a corporation's certificate of incorporation a provi-
sion limiting or eliminating directors' personal monetary liability
for certain breaches of the duty of care."'
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code provides:
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the
107. Veasey, Further Reflections, supra note 38, at 1382.
108. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
109. This statement is easy to make, but difficult to apply. The Van Gorkom opin-
ion is helpful, however, when read as a "discourse on doctrine and judicial attitude,"
setting forth the "explicit and implicit do's and don'ts" of the life in the boardroom. See
Manning, Life in the Boardroom, supra note 42, at 3. Mr. Manning lists these "do's and
don'ts," with specific references to the facts of Van Gorkom in the Appendix to his arti-
cle. See id. at 8-14.
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). Subsection (7) was added to
the existing provisions of § 102(b), which deals with the contents of the certificate of
incorporation. The Delaware Legislature also clarified and revised portions of § 145,
which deals with the indemnification of officers, directors, employees, and agents. See id.
§ 145(b), (e), (f) & (j) (effective July 1, 1986).
111. Veasey and Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute, supra note 9, at 3.
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certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the
certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the
following matters:...
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of
a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions
not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, (iii) under section 174 of this Title, or
(iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an im-
proper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or
limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring
prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All
references in this subsection to a director shall also be deemed
to refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation
which is not authorized to issue capital stock.
112
The effective date of the new legislation was July 1, 1986, and
the limited liability permitted by section 102(7)(b) will become
effective if and when appropriate charter amendments are pro-
posed by a corporation's board of directors and adopted by its
shareholders. 113
In all probability, this statute is a response to the recent
decline in the availability and scope of coverage of officers' and
directors' liability insurance.1 4 The statute primarily addresses
the concerns raised by the Van Gorkom decision, discussed
above, in which the court found the directors personally liable in
money damages for their gross negligence. Interestingly, the
statute disallows any limitation of directors' liability for viola-
tions of the duty of loyalty.11
5
Section 102(b)(7) appropriately places the ability to limit or
eliminate directors' liability for due care violations in the hands
of those to whom the directors owe their duty of care.1 16 Addi-
112. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
113. Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute, supra note 19, at 3.
114. Id. at 1-2. The charter provisions, however, only apply prospectively and only
to directors' actions qua directors and not to officers' actions qua officers. Id. at 3.
115. Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute, supra note 9, at 1. The statute
also pertains only to limitations on money damages. Other remedies for violation of the
duty of care, such as injunctions and recission, remain unaffected. Id. at 3.
116. Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute, supra note 9, at 3. The legisla-
[Vol. 38
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tionally, it provides shareholders with great flexibility in making
such decisions. For instance, shareholders of a corporation may
place a ceiling on directors' liability, restrict the types or catego-
ries of conduct to which limitations apply, or eliminate their lia-
bility altogether." 7 Thus, the Delaware Legislature has given
shareholders of corporations the ability to implement a limita-
tion of liability plan tailored to their individual needs. Although
section 102(b)(7) clearly does not represent a codification of the
business judgment rule nor does it provide directors with an all-
purpose shield from personal liability, it is clearly significant be-
cause it gives shareholders the ability to eliminate or limit per-
sonal liability of directors for due care violations."" Other states
may follow Delaware's lead in explicitly allowing such action.
IV. A COMPARISON OF DELAWARE AND SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
A. Codification of the Standard of Care
Although the courts of South Carolina have not explicitly
discussed the business judgment rule, several cases have ad-
dressed the directorial duties of care and loyalty. These cases
recognize the general concepts behind the rule even though they
do not contain an articulation of the rule itself. Additionally, the
Legislature, in South Carolina Code section 33-13-150(a),11 9 has
codified various corporate matters touching upon the rule, in-
ture considered and rejected several alternative proposals. For instance, it rejected as
circular the proposal that Delaware Code § 145(b) be amended to allow indemnification
of judgments or amounts paid in settlement in derivative suits since such indemnifica-
tion would, in effect, enable the corporation to pay itself for injuries caused by its direc-
tors. Id. at 2. Also rejected as circular was the proposal that § 145(g) be amended to
allow wholly owned subsidiaries or captives to provide "insurance" without any true risk
sharing. Id. The Legislature also opted against an arbitrary statutory limit on personal
liability of directors. Id. at 2-3. Finally, a statutory exemption for certain types of liabil-
ity was rejected because such a scheme would deprive shareholders of any input into the
matter. Id. at 3. Clearly, § 102(b)(7) was carefully worded to allow shareholders to make
the ultimate decision about the limitation of directors' liability in cases involving gross
negligence.
117. Veasey & Finkelstein, New Delaware Statute, supra note 9, at 3.
118. Id.
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(a) (1976). Section 33-13-150(a) may also be read to
impose a duty of loyalty on directors and officers. See infra Part IV.C. Delaware has not
codified the standard of care for directors. The "gross negligence" standard is the prod-
uct of case law. See, e.g., supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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cluding the general standard of care required of directors. Sec-
tion 33-13-150(a) states:
A director or officer shall perform his duties as a director
or officer, including his duties as a member of any committee
of the board of directors upon which he may serve, in good
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation and of its shareholders, and with
such care as an ordinary prudent person in a like position
would use under similar circumstances. 120
A director who performs in accordance with this standard will be
shielded from personal liability to the corporation or its
shareholders.
121
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(a) (1976). Under this statute, the duty clearly runs
to both the corporation and its shareholders. Delaware apparently recognizes this dual
duty even though it is not codified. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. 1981), overruled on other
grounds, 457 A.2d 701, 703-704 (Del. 1983). The RMBCA, however, does not provide for
such dual duty and states, instead, that the duty runs to the corporation only. See supra
note 2. The preliminary version of the reporter's comments to the proposed revision of
South Carolina Code § 33-13-150(a) discusses this difference:
Under the Model Act, the duties owed run only to the benefit of the corpora-
tion, whereas under . . . [South Carolina state law] the duty has run to the
corporation and its shareholders. Shareholders have been express statutory
beneficiaries of duties owed by corporate insiders. [T]he underlying princip!e
of shareholders being express beneficiaries of fiduciary duties pre-dates the
technical amendment made in 1963. South Carolina case law since Black v.
Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913), has firmly embraced the notion that
officers and directors owe duties to shareholders as well as the entity. The
principle has been applied in insider trading cases, see Jacobson v. Yaschik,
249 S.C. 577, 584, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1967), and squeeze-out cases, see Dibble
v. Sumter Ice & Fuel Co., 283 S.C. 278, 322 S.E.2d 674 (1984).
In 1981 the South Carolina Legislature adopted verbatim the Model Act's
articulation of duties owed with the exception that the established principle
that shareholders of South Carolina corporations are express statutory benefi-
ciaries of duties owed was retained .... The substance of the current Model
Act provisions has not changed since it was last reviewed at the time of the
1981 amendments.
S.C. CoDn ANN. § 3-8-300 comments (Proposed Official Draft 1986) (emphasis in origi-
nal). This proposed section would replace § 33-13-150.
Whether the revised version of § 33-13-150(a) should include the words "and of its
shareholders" has been debated by the Corporate Code Revision Study Committee. Ad-
vocates of the inclusion of this language argue that the deletion of this language would
signal a repudiation of prior law. Those arguing for the deletion of this language argue
that the South Carolina Code should parallel the RMBCA and that eliminating the ref-
erence to the duty as running to shareholders would encourage people to serve as direc-
tors. Id.
121. Director liability failure to meet the standards set forth in § 33-13-150 is infer-
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The language in section 33-13-150(a), which incorporates
the twin duties of loyalty and care, resembles the Aronson for-
mulation of the business judgment rule; however, the two stan-
dards are not identical. One obvious distinction is that the
South Carolina version has codified a general standard of care,
whereas the Delaware formulation is supplied by common law.122
In addition to the statutory versus common law distinction, the
substantive differences between the formulations of the stan-
entially imposed by § 33-13-150(c), which states, "A person performing his duties as an
officer or director in accord with the standard required under subsections (a) and (b) of
this section shall have no liability to the corporation or its shareholders by reason of
being or having been an officer or director for any acts or omissions." S.C. CODE ANN. §
33-13-150(c) (1976). The standard of conduct codified in the RMBCA has been described
as aspirational. See Veasey, New Insights, supra note 1, at 1466. A director who dis-
charges his duties in accordance with this standard should not be held personally liable.
Additionally, § 33-13-190, which deals with the liability of directors in certain cases,
states: "A director shall not be liable under this section if he has met the requirements of
§ 33-13-150." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-190(d) (1976). Section 33-13-190 imposes liability
upon directors "in addition to any other liabilities imposed by law" and specifically
states that directors may be held liable for the declaration of any dividends or other
distribution of the assets of the corporation to its shareholders contrary to statutory
provisions, for the purchase or redemption of shares contrary to statutory provisions, for
the improper distribution of corporate assets during liquidation, and for the making of
any loan or guaranty or other form of security in violation of § 33-13-170. Id. § 33-13-
190(b).
Directors have also been held liable, on the basis of common-law principles, for vari-
ous derelictions of duty in cases predating the enactment of the South Carolina Business
Corporation Act. See Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 114
S.E.2d 321 (1960) (holding directors liable for inattention and negligent supervision of
officers); Baker v. Mutual Loan & Inv. Co., 213 S.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 692 (1949) (holding
directors liable for the wrongful payment of dividends through bad faith, gross negli-
gence, or inattentiveness); Mortimer v. D.T. McKeithan Lumber Corp., 127 S.C. 266, 120
S.E. 723 (1923) (holding directors liable for mismanagement of corporate affairs as result
of gross negligence or willful destruction and for the misappropriation of corporate funds
and property); Black v. Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913) (holding directors
liable for fraudulent breach of trust).
Section 33-13-150(d) provides that "[ain action against a director or officer for fail-
ure to perform the duties imposed by this section shall be commenced within three (3)
years after the cause of action has accrued, or within two (2) years after the time when
the cause of action is discovered, or should reasonably have been discovered, by a person
complaining thereof, whichever sooner occurs." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(d) (1976). A
similar limitations provision is found in S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-190(h) (1976). This lan-
guage does not provide for tolling based upon fraudulent concealment. The proposed
revision would read the same as § 33-13-150(d), but would add a provision stating, "pro-
vided, however, that this limitations period shall not apply to breaches of duty which
have been fraudulently concealed." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300 comments (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1986).
122. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(a) with Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984).
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dard of care in the two states appear striking. South Carolina
law requires that directors act with ordinary prudence,123
whereas Delaware courts impose liability only upon a showing of
gross negligence.
The courts of South Carolina have not yet applied section
33-13-150(a), and practitioners can only speculate about how the
ordinary prudence standard will be applied. Does the require-
ment of ordinary prudence imply that directors will be held lia-
ble for ordinary negligence? Such an expectation appears rea-
sonable. 124 If this interpretation is correct, however, other state
courts have "cheat[ed] the expectation" despite their applica-
tion of an identical standard. 25
Perhaps one should view liability associated with the gen-
eral standard of care of directors as neither "ordinary negli-
gence" nor "gross negligence," but as the failure to exercise the
requisite degree of care.126 This distinction is more than seman-
tic and is reinforced by the blurring of these phrases by courts.
While the difference between the ordinary and gross negligence
standards appears great, some commentators have argued that
an ordinary prudence statute does not result in a higher stan-
dard nor does it necessarily ensure that a court applying that
standard will impose liability in situations in which a Delaware
court, applying the gross negligence standard, would not.1 27 Per-
haps the phrase "gross negligence" is not used to lower the stan-
dard of care, but, rather, to refer to conduct that fails to satisfy
the ordinary prudence standard.
1 2
8
123. Several cases decided before the enactment of § 33-13-150(a) applied a similar
standard. See, e.g., Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 114
S.E.2d 321 (1960); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935). Some cases,
however, referred to gross negligence as the proper standard. See, e.g., Baker v. Mutual
Loan & Inv. Co., 213 S.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 692 (1948); Mortimer v. D.T. McKeithan Lum-
ber Corp., 127 S.C. 266, 120 S.E. 723 (1923).
124. See Veasey & Manning, supra note 2, at 926. One commentator, Professor
Dyson, claims that at least three-fourths of the jurisdictions that require ordinary care
impose liability for its correlative-ordinary negligence. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 10, at 948-49.
127. Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard, supra note 2, at 930; see also Pease,
supra note 21, at 69.
128. Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 10, at 949; see also Pease, supra note 21, at 71-72.
The counter-argument is that gross negligence is qualitatively different from ordinary
negligence since it requires a finding of reckless disregard of a known risk. See Veasey &
Manning, Codified Standard, supra note 2, at 928.
[Vol. 38
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In other words, the label does not determine the outcome; 2 "
a court typically will decide a case based upon its own views of
how directors should behave. Varying results generally are not
the product of different standards, but rather, of varying judicial
attitudes.130 Thus, courts do not attempt to define gross negli-
gence; 13 1 they simply point to behavior that constitutes gross
negligence. Similarly:
Courts do not hear evidence as to what an "ordinary prudent
man" would do, either in the conduct of his own affairs or in
the particular circumstances of the case. Nor do they compare
the facts of cases, arguing, for example, that since other courts
have decided that it is negligent for directors to buy a piece of
real estate without actually seeing it, any director who does so
is liable for subsequent loss to the company. Instead, courts
repeat that "negligence is a question of fact dependent upon
the circumstances of each case" and proceed to apply their own
ideas of what is reasonable conduct for a director.'
3 2
As one commentator noted, "Since our 'excellent, but odious'
friend-the ordinarily prudent person-never takes the stand to
enlighten judges or juries, the standard of care that exalts his
prudence actually encourages a substitution of the court's judg-
ment for that of the defendant director."' 33
129. Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 10, at 950-51; Veasey & Manning, Codified Stan-
dard, supra note 2, at 928.
130. Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard, supra note 2, at 930.
131. Id. at 928.
132. Nielsen, Directors' Duties Under Anglo-American Corporation Law, 43 U. DT.
L.J. 605, 612 (1966), quoted in Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard, supra note 2, at
931.
133. Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard, supra note 2, at 931. This effect is in
conflict with the basic premises upon which the business judgment rule is based. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text. Thus, the application of the ordinarily prudent
man standard to corporate directors has been criticized as inappropriate. Bayless Man-
ning, for example, stated as follows:
In the general field of negligence law we are all able to talk of the "reason-
able man" and of the prudent standard of performance because we have from
our daily experience a clear conception of what the actor is doing and a fairly
clear conception of the way in which people normally do it. We know what an
automobile driver is doing; he is driving a car. We all know from general expe-
rience how one would normally do that in the circumstance-and therefore
how he should do it.
The situation with regard to the directors of corporations is totally differ-
ent. There is no agreed upon roster of functions of a director, analogous to
driving the car. We do not have any common standard or experience as to what
1987]
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A decision as to directoral liability depends thus largely
upon the trier of fact's perceptions of prevailing business prac-
tices and legal requirements.1 3 4 Courts might look to the behav-
ior of directors of other corporations in determining whether the
behavior of directors of a given corporation was in keeping with
common business practices. A South Carolina court considering
a case involving the business judgment rule could legitimately
reach a different conclusion than a Delaware court considering
the same facts because of different business practices within the
two states. If, however, one accepts the proposition that the
standard of care for directors is roughly the same in both states,
the analysis leading up to the factual holdings should be similar.
Another distinction between the South Carolina statute and
the Delaware formulation of the business judgment rule is that
the South Carolina Code requires that directors "reasonably"
believe action taken to be in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, while the courts of Delaware require an
"honest" belief that action taken was in the best interests of the
company. 135 The significance of this difference is debatable.
Some commentators argue that the reasonable belief test is a
"hidden reef" in the business judgment rule "safe harbor" be-
cause it expands the judiciary's role by allowing inquiry into the
quality of the particular decision.13 6 Other commentators, how-
ever, respond that the reasonableness test is a sensible limitation
on the business judgment rule that preserves the full protection
afforded by the Delaware formulation of that rule.13 7 These com-
mentators explain that determining the reasonableness of the di-
rectors' belief is quite different from determining whether the
substantive decision was correct. 8 Under either formula-
tion-"reasonable" or "honest"-courts inquire "into the facts
and circumstances of a challenged transaction to such extent as
directors do; and what they do varies from company to company, from situa-
tion to situation, and from time to time.
Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 30, at 1493; accord Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
134. Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 10, at 951.
135. For a discussion of the difference between a reference to the duty as running to
the corporation and the shareholders, as opposed to just the corporation, see supra note
120.
136. Veasey & Manning, supra note 2, at 930-42.
137. Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 10, at 962.
138. Id. at 955.
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may be necessary to enable the court to ascertain whether the
directors' decision was an exercise of informed, reasoned judg-
ment or an arbitrary and reckless decision." 13
The official comments to section 35 of the 1969 Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act,140 which was the basis for section 33-13-
150(a) of the current South Carolina Code, support the proposi-
tion that the use of the word "reasonably" in place of Aronson's
"honest" does not represent a substantive difference. The official
comments state:
By combining the requirement of good faith with the
statement that a director must act "with such care as an ordi-
narily prudent person in a like position would use under simi-
lar circumstances," section 35 incorporates the familiar concept
that, these criteria being satisfied, a director should not be lia-
ble for an honest mistake of business judgment. A director at-
tempting to create profits for his corporation will frequently
make decisions involving risk for the enterprise. No personal
liability should be imposed upon him in the event his good
faith decision, in the exercise of business judgment, later seems
to have been erroneous.
141
Thus, a strong argument can be made that the "reasonableness"
versus "honest" distinction does not create a major substantive
difference between the South Carolina and Delaware formula-
tions of directors' duty of care.
On the other hand, the use of the word "reasonably" in sec-
tion 33-13-150(a) presumably relates to section 33-13-150(b), 42
discussed in more detail below, which allows directors to rely on
reports and information supplied by third parties if they "rea-
sonably" believe in those persons' reliability. Subsection (b) thus
provides a "due diligence" defense or "safe harbor" in an action
alleging want of care or skill by an officer or director. 43 Section
33-13-150(b) also states that a director does not act in good faith
if he has actual knowledge that causes the reliance to be unwar-
139. Id. at 961; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(b) (1976); infra notes 161-65
and accompanying text.
140. MBCA § 35 official comments at 254.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(b) (1976); see also infra notes 151-52 and accompa-
nying text.
143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150 reporter's comments at 241 (Proposed Official Draft
1979).
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ranted. If this means that a director must know of the falsity of
information before reliance is foreclosed, then the "honest" be-
lief standard is broader than the "reasonable" belief test of sec-
tion 33-13-150. The "actual knowledge" language, however, may
merely impose a requirement that directors act honestly by not
relying on information known or suspected to be false. This in-
terpretation reinforces the conclusion that the "reasonably" ver-
sus "honest" distinction creates no substantive difference in the
law.
B. Probable South Carolina Treatment of Van Gorkom
An examination of how the South Carolina Supreme Court
might treat Delaware's Van Gorkom is helpful in further demon-
strating the extent of congruence between business judgment
rule jurisprudence in the two states. The primary holding in
Van Gorkom was that directors, in order to fulfill their duty of
care, must inform themselves of all material, relevant facts
before voting upon a given matter.144 Although this duty is not
expressly codified within the South Carolina formulation of the
duty of care,1 45 the South Carolina Supreme Court would be
likely to agree with this requirement. Indeed, the court implied
such a duty on the basis of common-law principles in Baker v.
Mutual Loan & Investment Co.,1 46 in which it held corporate
directors liable for not making an adequate effort to inform
themselves before voting to declare a dividend.
14 7
In Baker the president of the corporation testified that he
saw the audits of the corporation, "but not being able to inter-
pret auditor's figures, of course, [he] could not tell much about
144. 488 A.2d at 872.
145. Arguably, the language of § 33-13-150(a) necessarily imposes upon directors a
duty to inquire and to inform themselves.
146. 213 S.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 692 (1948). Additional proof that the South Carolina
statute incorporates a duty to inform oneself is found in the comments to RMBCA §
8.30, upon which § 33-13-150(a) was based, which state that the duty of care requires
that directors exercise "common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment."
RMBCA § 8.30 official comments at 222 (1984).
147. 213 S.C. at 566, 50 S.E.2d at 695. At the time this case was decided, South
Carolina had no statute expressly imposing civil liability on a director for paying divi-
dends that have not been earned. Id. at 565, 50 S.E.2d at 695. Liability is now explicitly
provided for by statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-190(b), (c) (1976).
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them.' 1 48 None of the directors testified that they had made any
inquiry of the auditors about the company's earnings.149 Had the
directors so inquired, they would have realized that the audits
showed that the business was being operated at a loss, thus mak-
ing the declaration of a dividend illegal.150 The court, therefore,
ordered the directors to repay to the company the amount that
had been paid out as dividends . 51 The requirement to act upon
an informed basis presumably is not limited to the decision to
declare a dividend and should apply to other corporate decisions
as well. Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court would
probably agree that the defendant directors in Van Gorkom had
a duty to inform themselves before voting to sell the company.
As discussed above, the law of South Carolina, like that of
Delaware, explicitly allows directors to rely on information
presented by others. Blind reliance, however, is not condoned.
Section 33-13-150(b) of the South Carolina Code 5 1 provides:
In performing his duties, a director or officer shall be enti-
tled to rely on information, opinions, reports and statements,
including financial statements and other financial data, in each
case prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation
whom the director or officer reasonably believes to be reliable
and competent in the matters presented;
(2) counsel, public accountants or other persons as to mat-
ters which the director or officer reasonably believes to be
within such person's professional or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors upon which he
does not serve, duly designated in accordance with a provision
of the articles of incorporation or the bylaws, as to matters
within its authority, which committee the director or officer
reasonably believes to merit confidence.
In such reliance under subsection (b), such director or of-
ficer shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he has
actual knowledge concerning the matter in question that would
cause such reliance to be unwarranted.5'5
148. Id. at 566, 50 S.E.2d at 695.
149. Id., 50 S.E.2d at 696.
150. Id. at 567, 50 S.E.2d at 696.
151. Id. at 558, 50 S.E.2d 693.
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(b) (1976).
153. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983), which states:
A member of the board of directors of any corporation organized under
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Directors are thus required to act "reasonably" and in "good
faith" before they may rely upon this statute.
A component of the good faith test is that actual knowledge
of the falsity of information supplied by third parties negates
good faith. The comments to the corresponding section of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act state:
[I]nherent in the concept of good faith is the requirement
that, in order to be entitled to rely on a report, statement,
opinion, or other matter, the director must have read the re-
port or statement in question, or have been present at a meet-
ing at which it was orally presented, or have taken other steps
to become generally familiar with its contents. In short, the di-
rector must comply with the general standard of care of section
8.30(a) in making a judgment as to the reliability and compe-
tence of the source of information upon which he proposes to
rely.15
4
Thus, the decision to rely on the reports of another is itself a
business decision, and a South Carolina corporate director has to
meet the standards of section 33-13-150(a) in choosing to rely on
the report or statement of a third party.
Although Baker was decided prior to the enactment of this
statute, that case indicates that directors do not discharge their
directorial duties in this regard "by shutting their eyes and
blindly relying on any statement made by [a third party]."'55 In
Baker a third party, who was neither a director nor an officer of
the corporation, was selling the corporation's stock to the public
on a commission basis. Consequently, he had an obvious interest
this chapter, or a member of any committee designated by the board of direc-
tors shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in
good faith upon the books of account or reports made to the corporation by
any of its officers, or by an independent certified public accountant, or by an
appraiser selected with reasonable care by the board of directors or by any
such committee, or in relying in good faith upon other records of the
corporation.
Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court might agree with the Delaware Supreme Court's
conclusion in Van Gorkom that certain presentations, such as that of Van Gorkom on
January 21, 1985, do not constitute reports within the meaning of the "right to rely"
statutes. See supra note 55.
154. RMBCA § 8.30(b) official comments at 223. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has also decreed that directors and officers have a duty to supervise one another.
See Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 328, 114 S.E.2d 321,
326 (1960).
155. 213 S.C. at 566, 50 S.E.2d at 695.
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in making it appear that the company was prosperous.156 The
court concluded that the directors had a duty to apprise them-
selves of this information and to safeguard the interests of the
shareholders.
Arguably, directors are on safer ground in relying on their
chief executive officer rather than on an interested third party.
However, because the chief executive officer may be interested
in the outcome of a vote, as was Van Gorkom, the Baker concern
about third parties may apply as well to insiders who have rea-
son to promote a particular vote. Therefore, directors should be
careful to satisfy their general duty of care in deciding whether
to rely on another person. Because South Carolina has recog-
nized that directors should inform themselves before a vote,
157
directors should not blindly rely on oral presentations, but
should, instead, seek to form their own judgments based on doc-
umented facts. Particularly in conflict of interest situations, the
board should consult outside advisors before reaching a decision.
This suggestion highlights another lesson of the Van
Gorkom decision: directors should act professionally in con-
ducting business transactions and should establish a "paper
trail" to evidence their efforts to inform themselves. The South
Carolina Supreme Court, however, has held that "[flormal direc-
tors' meetings and minutes are not indispensable to corporate
action in all cases."158 Nevertheless, certain transactions, such as
156. Id. at 566, 50 S.E.2d at 695-96.
157. See Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 328-30, 114
S.E.2d 321, 326-27 (1960).
158. Industrial Equip. Co. v. Montague, 224 S.C. 510, 516, 80 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1954).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-120(a)(3) (1976) states as follows:
(a) Action taken without a meeting by a majority of directors, or by such
larger vote as the articles of incorporation or the by-laws may require, shall be
deemed action of the board of directors: ...
(3) If the directors take informal action pursuant to a custom of that cor-
poration known generally to its shareholders, and all directors know of the ac-
tion taken and no director makes prompt objection thereto.
Id.; see also id. § 33-13-160 (revised to delete the requirement that director's interest in
a given transaction be noted in board's minutes). But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-190(g)
(1976) (requiring dissenting vote to be entered into the minutes; otherwise, assent to a
given transaction will be assumed); see also Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759
(1972).
In Talbot the South Carolina Supreme Court held that where the minutes of meet-
ings of stockholders and directors made no mention that the president of the corporation
was to be the contractor with which the corporation was contracting the president's exe-
cution of the construction contract was done without making a full disclosure of his iden-
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a vote on a merger or the adoption of a defensive mechanism,
should be treated with greater formality. Moreover, because cor-
porate minutes serve as the best evidence of actions taken, pru-
dence dictates that a clear record should be kept of what tran-
spires at all meetings. Otherwise, directors may be unable to
prove that they acted with the requisite care if charged with a
breach of their directorial duties.
C. The Duty of Loyalty
Section 33-13-150(a), which requires that a director act in
good faith and in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in
the best interest of the corporation, 159 makes it clear that South
Carolina imposes a duty of loyalty upon corporate directors. Ad-
ditionally, several cases predating this statute evidence the exis-
tence of a duty of loyalty by explicitly referring to the fiduciary
relationship existing between directors and the individual share-
holders. These references appear primarily in cases involving
"interested director" transactions. In Talbot v. James,16 0 for in-
stance, the supreme court held that officers and directors of a
corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual stock-
holders and in every instance must make full disclosure of all
relevant facts when entering into a contract with the
corporation.
Similarly, in Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary'6 the court
tity of interest, and the corporation was entitled to recover the amount of corporate
funds received by or paid in behalf of the president. Id. at 86, 190 S.E.2d at 766. Thus,
the South Carolina Supreme Court appears to support the view, discussed by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom, that directors owe a fiduciary duty of candor to the
shareholders and that directors should make a record of their actions to evidence their
fulfillment of this duty. See supra notes 68-72.
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150(a) (1976); see supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
160. 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759 (1972). In Talbot the court stated that a transac-
tion between an interested director and the corporation will be voidable if the director
han not made full disclosure or paid full value or if the corporation has been imposed
upon. Id. at 83, 190 S.E.2d at 764; accord Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d
601 (1967) (stating that officers and directors of a corporation, as a matter of law, stand
in a fiduciary relationship to individual stockholders and must make full disclosure of all
relevant facts when purchasing shares of stock from a stockholder).
161. 219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E.2d 524 (1951). In Gilbert the court stated as follows:
[Wihen a director, in selling corporation property to himself, represents or
joins in the representation of the corporation, the transaction is voidable at the
option of the corporation, or others suing in its behalf, merely upon proof of
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stated:
Undoubtedly the directors of a corporation in the management
of the corporate affairs occupy a position of extreme trust and
confidence and exercise great power for good or bad over the
corporation and its shareholders. They are agents for the cor-
poration. Toward it and the shareholders they undoubtedly
stand in a fiduciary relation as far as corporate business is
concerned.
162
Presumably, this fiduciary standard will not be strictly enforced,
and directors who meet the standards of section 33-13-150(a)
will be protected from liability. 163
South Carolina Code section 33-13-160164 now codifies South
Carolina law regarding the treatment of transactions involving
interested directors. Section 33-13-160 states that a transaction
tainted by a director's self-interest is not necessarily void or
voidable solely for this reason or because of his presence or par-
ticipation in the meeting or if his vote is counted, if:
(1) The material facts as to his interest and as to the
transaction are disclosed to the board of directors or commit-
tee, which the board of directors or committee authorizes, ap-
proves or ratifies the transaction by a vote sufficient for such
purpose without counting the vote of the interested director or
directors; or
(2) Although the vote of the interested director or direc-
tors is decisive of approval or disapproval of the transaction,
the material facts as to his interest and as to the transaction
the fact stated; but when the purchasing director abstains from participation
in behalf of the corporation and it is properly represented by others who are
personally disinterested, the transaction will stand under attack if the director
has made full disclosure, paid full value, and the corporation has not been im-
posed upon; and the burden is upon the director to establish these requisites
by evidence.
Id. at 186-87, 64 S.E.2d at 529. This policy is now codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-
160(a) (1976). Under the common-law rule, an interested director could not be counted
to make a quorum at a meeting when the matter is acted upon. 219 S.C. at 187-88, 64
S.E.2d at 530; accord Talbot, 259 S.C. at 82-83, 190 S.E.2d at 764. This rule has been
reversed by Code § 33-13-160(d), which states that "[c]ommon or interested directors
may always be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the
board of directors or of a committee which authorizes, approves, or ratifies a transac-
tion." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160(d) (1976).
162. 219 S.C. at 185, 64 S.E.2d at 528-29.
163. See supra note 14,
164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (1976).
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are disclosed to the shareholders, and the transaction is specifi-
cally approved by vote of the shareholders without counting
the votes of any shares owned or controlled by the interested
director or directors; or
(3) If not approved pursuant to subparagraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection, the transaction is fair and equitable as to
the corporation at the time it is authorized or approved, and
the party asserting the fairness of the transaction establishes
fairness. 65
The statute provides the three aforementioned alternative meth-
ods to save a transaction involving an interested director from
being automatically voidable. Nothing in the statute, however,
precludes judicial inquiry. The statute simply precludes invali-
dation of a contract "solely" because a director is involved. 66
Although the language of section 33-13-160 does not address
director liability, the majority rule in other jurisdictions appears
to be that if an interested director fails to sustain his burden of
proof that the corporate transaction in which he had a personal
interest was fair and made in good faith, the corporation has the
option of setting aside the transaction or affirming it and hold-
ing the interested director liable for profits that he received or
for losses sustained by the corporation as a result of the transac-
165. Id. § 33-13-160(a). The corresponding Delaware statute states in part that
transactions between corporations and interested directors are not necessarily void or
voidable if "[t]he material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon,
and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders . .. ." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983) (emphasis added).
Under South Carolina law, transactions in which a director or officer has a personal
interest include: (1) a contract or any other transaction between the corporation and one
or more of its directors or officers; and (2) a contract or any other transaction between a
corporation and any corporation, partnership, or association in which one or more of its
directors or officers are directors or officers or have a material financial interest, direct or
indirect. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160(b) (1976). The notion of adverse interest is qualified
by "material" financial interest to cover the situation where a director may have a minor
stock ownership or other interest without any real conflict existing. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
13-160 reporter's comments at 244 (Proposed Official Draft 1979).
There is an overlap in the definitions of interested director contracts and interlock-
ing directorate contracts. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160(a), (b)(2) (1976) with id.
§ 33-13-160(c). Section 33-13-160(a) requires proof of fairness of director contracts, while
§ 33-13-160(c) requires proof of unfairness in the case of common directors. Thus, con-
tracts between corporations having a common director are subject to different rules.
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (1976). This statute does not provide an absolute
safe harbor; rather, it shifts the burden of proof to directors to show that a transaction
should not be voided.
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tion.1 67 Thus, under South Carolina law, an interested director
arguably could be held personally liable to the corporation for
personal profits or corporate losses resulting from a transaction
that is deemed unfair and voidable under section 33-13-160, but
not from a transaction that is not voidable under that section.
D. No Provision for Shareholder Limitation of Directors'
Liability
The South Carolina Business Corporation Act contains no
provision paralleling section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code,
which permits shareholders to include within the certificate of
incorporation a provision limiting or eliminating directors' liabil-
ity for due care violations. 168 South Carolina Code section 33-7-
30,169 however, states, in pertinent part, that the articles of in-
corporation shall set forth:
(7) Any other provisions [in addition to those enumerated
in subsections (1)-(6)] which the incorporators elect to include
in the articles if:
(A) Any section of Chapters I through 25 of this Title per-
mits or authorizes the articles to contain such a provision; or
(B) Any section of Chapters 1 through 25 of this Title per-
mits or requires the provision to be set forth in the corpora-
tion's bylaws or in an agreement or other instrument; or
(C) Such provision relates to the business or affairs of the
corporation, or the rights or powers of its shareholders, direc-
tors, or officers and although not specifically authorized by
Chapters 1 through 25 of this Title, is not inconsistent with law
or contrary to public policy.
170
167. See 19 AM. Jun. 2D Corporations § 1291 (1965). The 1979 reporter's comments
to South Carolina Code § 33-13-160 state:
Disclosure of the conflicts of interest must be made pursuant to subsec-
tions (a)(1) and (2) to the shareholders and directors of the corporation,
whether or not they are entitled to vote. Knowledge will not be presumed
under the revised subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). The disclosure must be made
to a properly constructed meeting. It should not apply in the situation where
there has been selective disclosure to only those directors or shareholders nec-
essary to approve the transaction. The notation of disclosure in board minutes
would be prudent, but it was not felt necessary to mandate its recording.
S.C. CODE: ANN. § 33-13-160 reporter's comments at 24 (Proposed Official Draft 1979).
168. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300 comments (Proposed Official Draft 1986).
169. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-30 (1976).
170. Id. § 33-7-30(a)(7)(A)-(C).
1987]
47
Poag: The Business Judgment Rule: An Analysis of South Carolina Law in
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
Arguably, under this language the incorporators may include in
the articles of incorporation a provision limiting the directors'
liability for their business decisions.
Moreover, this power, if it exists, is probably transferred to
the corporate entity under Code section 33-15-10,171 which
states:
(a) A corporation may amend its articles of incorporation,
from time to time, in any and as many respects as may be de-
sired if such amendment, on the filing date of the articles of
amendment incorporating the amendment, contains only such
provisions as might then lawfully be contained in the original
articles of incorporation, and, if a change in shares or the rights
of shareholders, or an exchange, reclassification or cancellation
of shares necessary to effect such change, exchange, reclassifi-
cation or cancellation.
(b) In particular, and without limitation upon the general
power of amendment granted by subsection (a) of this section,
a corporation may amend its articles of incorporation by one or
more amendments so as: ...
(15) To strike out, change or add any provision for man-
agement of the business and conduct of the affairs of the cor-
poration, or creating, defining, limiting and regulating the pow-
ers of the corporation, its officers, its directors and
shareholders or any class of shareholders, including any provi-
sion which under Chapters 1 through 25 of this Title is re-
quired or permitted to be set forth in the bylaws, or in any
agreement.1
7 2
While this language might allow provisions limiting or eliminat-
ing directors liability to be placed in the articles of incorpora-
tion, the enactment of a specific enabling statute is advisable if
the South Carolina Legislature decides that the option of pro-
viding directors with this protection is desirable. Indeed, an ar-
gument could be made that shareholders are precluded from
limiting directors' liability by the language of South Carolina
Code section 33-13-180,173 which enumerates the circumstances
under which indemnity is permitted and may be viewed as the
exclusive statement on this matter. Similarly, the codification of
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-15-10 (1976).
172. Id. § 33-15-10(a), (b)(15).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-180 (1976).
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the standard of care in section 33-13-150(a) may preclude share-
holders from limiting directors' liability for due care violations.
Moreover, the Delaware Legislature enacted section 102(b)(7)
even though Delaware Code section 102(b)(1) already provided:
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the
certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the
certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the
following matters:
Any provision for the management of the business and for
the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of
the stockholders, or the members of a nonstock corporation; if
such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State. Any
provision which is required or permitted by any section of this
chapter to be stated in the bylaws may instead be stated in the
certificate of incorporation ... .174
Thus, the Delaware Legislature apparently felt the need to enact
an express enabling statute. Whether the South Carolina Code
should include an enabling statute similar to section 102(b)(7) is,
of course, a decision for the South Carolina Legislature. This de-
cision, however, should be made only after consideration of
whether protection for directors is necessary or advisable in
South Carolina because of high insurance costs or unease among
directors generally.
17 5
V. CONCLUSION
Although the vehicles and verbal formulations differ, the
law of South Carolina regarding the business judgment rule
largely parallels that of Delaware. As a general proposition, the
courts of both states recognize the advisability of according judi-
cial deference to business decisions made by corporate directors,
but will examine the decisionmaking process behind board deci-
sions to ensure that the directors did not breach the duties of
care or loyalty that underlie the business judgment rule.
174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (1983).
175. The Corporate Code Revision Study Committee of South Carolina, at the time
of this writing, had considered and rejected the inclusion of such a provision within the
South Carolina Revised Business Corporation Act.
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The Delaware courts frame the business judgment rule as a
presumption. Absent an abuse of discretion, the courts will pre-
sume that a director has complied with the twin duties of care
and loyalty. A director meets the duty of care by acting on an
informed basis. Liability for failure to exercise due care is pre-
mised upon concepts of gross negligence. Van Gorkom under-
scores the need to apply informed attention to directorial duties.
Moran, however, demonstrates that a director need not know all
the particulars of a given transaction; the business judgment
rule requires only that he acquire all material information rea-
sonably available. A recently enacted Delaware statute permits
shareholders to limit or eliminate directors' liability for due care
violations by including in the articles of incorporation a provi-
sion to that effect. Shareholders of Delaware corporations, how-
ever, cannot limit or eliminate the directors' duty of loyalty.
Delaware law regarding the duty of loyalty requires that di-
rectors act in good faith and in the honest belief that action
taken was in the best interest of the company. A director may
not stand on both sides of a transaction, nor may he reap a per-
sonal benefit not shared by the corporation and shareholders.
He must disclose any personal interest and abstain from partici-
pation in any corporate decision touching upon his interest. Fur-
thermore, he must act independently of any control or influence.
Moran, however, demonstrates that directors may adopt defen-
sive mechanisms, which necessarily give rise to loyalty questions,
without breaching their duty of loyalty so long as they act within
the ambits of the business judgment rule.
South Carolina has codified most of the above-mentioned
propositions in section 33-13-150(a), which states that a director
must perform his duties in good faith, in a manner he reasona-
bly believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and
shareholders, and with such care as an ordinary prudent person
in a like position would use under similar circumstances. This
formulation, especially when read in conjunction with pertinent
South Carolina case law, is very similar to Delaware law. The
courts of South Carolina should, therefore, feel comfortable in
looking to Delaware case law when dealing with issues relating
to the business judgment rule.
The language within section 33-13-150 may be viewed as the
bare bones of the business judgment rule. Courts, however, are
free to elaborate upon this statement of the standard of care,
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and they have great discretion both in formulating and in apply-
ing the complete rule. Nevertheless, the statutory language is
the starting point, and a director who meets its standards should
not be held liable for business decisions. Corporate counsel,
therefore, should advise their client directors to conform their
actions to the dictates of this statute, especially when voting
upon takeover offers or the implementation of defensive
mechanisms.
Practitioners should be aware, however, that the ultimate
decision of whether a director has met this standard is left to
the courts. The courts decide, for example, what constitutes or-
dinary prudence. Theoretically, a South Carolina court could
read section 33-13-150 to impose liability for ordinary negligence
or allow a review of the reasonableness of the decision reached.
Such a harsh application of the statute, however, could bring
about the ill effects feared in the aftermath of Van Gorkom and
could severely handicap the smooth functioning of corporate
business. The wiser course would be for the judiciary ordinarily
to defer to the judgment of the board of directors. To the extent
that a board can demonstrate its sensitivity to judicial concerns
about breaches of fiduciary duty, the reviewing court should be
comfortable with the business judgment rule's presumption of
validity.176 Only when a director effectively rebuts one or more
of the presumptions underlying the business judgment rule
should the court impose personal liability upon directors for
their business decisions.
176. See Guidelines for Directors, supra note 23, at 220; see also Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
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